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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines two types of third sector housing organi-
zation--non-profit housing corporation and non-profit co-operative--in
their attempts to intervene in the central land and housing market so
as to make it possible to allow working class families to continue
living in inner-city neighborhoods.
Though both organizations had similar objectives, they adopted
different process framework for negotiations, decision making, and
control. The framework was in turn affected by the neighborhoods'
socio-economic contexts, by the organizations' base and structure,
and by the scale and type of the projects.
The study analyzes in detail the setting in which the major
interest groups interacted: the strategies they used to gain political
support; and the way they negotiated for the control of their interests.
Furthermore, the study finds that working class neighborhoods cannot be
categorized into class stereotypes.
The triptych of ideology, interests, and control forms a useful
basis for explaining why working class homeowners and middle class
renovators behaved in the same manner and shared identical viewpoints,
or why middle class advocates wanted to provide affordable housing to
which working class property owners objected.
The study concludes that third sector housing is instrumental in
preserving inner-city neighborhoods for the incumbent residents to stay.
Among the two types of third sector housing, co-operatives bridge the
gaps between control and management, between ownership and consumer rights,
and between shelter/use and shelter/investment.
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Tunney Lee
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5INTRODUCTION
Inner-city housing stock for low and moderate income families has been
systemmatically reduced by development forces brought about by different
processes: the urban renewal of the 1960s; the current government
revitalization programs; and the ongoing 'up-filtering' or genteel
blockbusting. The displacement of the less privileged families,
as a result of market reinvestments in inner-city neighborhoods is a
worldwide phenomenon. [see Donald Appleyard. The Conservation of
European Cities. M.I.T. Press, 1979.]
Not only do these forces push out the less economically compatible
blue collar class and fragment the neighborhoods' social and economic
structure, they also generate a greater political reactivism among the
'renovators' that further disparages the interests of the incumbent
low income families and consolidates the interests of the white collar
class.
Depending on the perspective from which we look at it, stabilizing
declining neighborhoods may mean unstabilizing the moderate and low income
families. Yet stabilizing these families in their neighborhoods need
6not mean promoting neighborhoods to decline. The term 'stabilizing' has,
therefore, a dual relationship: first, stabilizing a 'declining' neigh-
borhood usually entails the eviction of the poor; and second, stabilizing
a 'rising' neighborhood connotes stopping the displacement of the moderate
and low income families. In the context of the thesis, I shall use
'stabilizing' to mean maintaining or preserving neighborhoods for the
incumbent working class families to stay and live.
INTENT
The thesis focuses on non-profit co-operative housing and non-profit
sponsored rental housing in inner-city neighborhoods as mechanisms for
stabilizing neighborhoods. Thus, one important aspect of this process is
examined--housing the moderate and low income families in inner-city neigh-
borhoods which are 'rising' or at the point of 'rising'.
The inquiry attempts to achieve the following three objectives:
o to understand how the dynamics of inner-city neighborhood
setting impact on the mechanisms--policy and organizational
structure--for providing non-profit co-operative and non-profit
rental housing;
o to examine what control the neighborhood groups have in the
development and planning processes-- who are served and by
what means, and what the conflicting issues and perceptions
are--that either fragment or integrate the structure of
the neighborhoods; and
o to explore those issues critical to the understanding of
non-profit housing in inner-city neighborhoods.
MODE OF INQUIRY
The approach to the study is structured on the belief that 'useful'
inquiry must be based on a particular constituency. The particular
groups advocated in the study consists of the moderate and low income
7families in inner-city neighborhoods. The thesis will be approached from
the perspective of these groups, in terms of their rights to remain in
their neighborhoods, if they so choose; to share in the decision making
process; to participate in a neighborhood based planning process; and to
achieve control over their environment.
In this manner, the study seeks to define the social and political
contexts through understanding the values and consciousness of people with
respect to the processes which operate around them, and through an analy-
tical framework as a springboard for action. Thus, the mode of inquiry
focuses on the power relations among various interest groups and organiza-
tions; on the bargaining process; and on the decision making mechanisms
for shaping patterns of social and environmental change in inner-city
neighborhoods.
CENTRAL QUESTIONS
The research will examine the two modes of operation--community based
non-profit housing co-operative groups and the 'outside' sponsored non-
profit rental housing organizations--in the way they develop affordable
housing in inner-city neighborhoods. In particular, the study will discuss
and compare the two "initiators" in terms of the following four questions:
1. To what extent are the social concerns and housing needs of
the neighborhoods resolved or not resolved?
2. Which mode of operation can be more conducive to the social
integration of inner-city neighborhoods?
3. How do the planning processes of these two "initiators" differ
in terms of gaining control over their development?
4. As mechanisms for providing affordable housing, how effective
are they in achieving that goal and in preserving inner-city
neighborhoods for the moderate and low income families?
8CASE STUDIES
The two case studies, described below, are chosen for two primary reasons.
First, they represent two different types of non-profit organization that
provide affordable housing in inner-city neighborhoods. Second, because
of the commonality of the political and social contexts
framework provides both the basis for comparing the two organizations and
for formulating relationships between the process outcomes and the organi-
zation's structure, between project implementation and neighborhood control
over the development.
The first case study is the Don Vale Co-operative Homes Inc. (DACHI),
a neighborhood based non-profit co-operative organization that was formed
for the purpose of providing low income housing in a neighborhood in which
the moderate and low income renters were being forced out by middle class
'whitepainters'--a term commonly used in Toronto for renovators. The
second case study is the City Non-profit Housing Corporation created to
provide non-profit rental housing for the working class residents. The
study focuses on one of the Corporation's projects--the Frankel/Lambert
Development--which is a large scale housing development for some 800 fami-
lies in a working class community.
STRUCTURE OF THESIS
The organization of the thesis is structured on three levels. First, a chron-
ological structure , used as the format for presenting the case studies, ties
different aspects of the case studies together so as to create a clear sense
of the sequence of events: views of major actors are presented at a parti-
cular point in time, prior to or after some significant events. Though
9aspects of the case studies are analyzed, the analysis is intended for
and pertains to each aspect. In this way, the chronological structure
avoids mixing of evidence, data, and views that belong to different
time horizon. The 'out of sequence' characteristic that often confuses
the reader is deliberately eliminated by structuring the case study on
a chronological order.
Second, the case study analysis, structured on a format based on
the central questions described earlier, connects different aspects of the
case. Each case study analysis is conducted because it allows in-depth
inquiry, permits different scope and direction of the analysis in a manner
each case study demands, and it avoids a comparative analysis that, if
conducted without prior analysis, limits the level, scope, and direction
of inquiry.
Third, the thesis organization is further integrated into a cohesive
study, after each case study is analyzed, by comparing (a) the various
aspects of the case studies, (b) the findings of the case studies, and
by exploring the various thematic issues that surfaced by the discussion
of the two case studies.
In this manner, the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter One
describes the background of the two types of roganizations; Chapter Two
presents a chronologically structured account of DACHI with analysis of
the aggregates of the case study; Chapter Three analyzes DACHI and posits
the case findings; Chapter Four presents Frankel/Lambert in the manner
similar to Chapter Two; Chapter Five analyzes Frankel/Lambert--but since
DACHI has been analyzed before, comparisons between the two case studies
are made--and posits the case findings; and Chapter Six synthesizes both
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the findings of DACHI and Frankel/Lambert, explores the basic issues
surfaced by both case studies, and posits the general findings of the
study with particular emphasis on non-profit co-operative organizations.
CONTEXT MAP
Source:
Legend:
Metropolitan Toronto, Annual Report 1965.
* #1, location of DACHI non-profit co-operative
housing project
* #2, location of Frankel/Lambert Development
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND FOR CO-OPERATIVES
& NON-PROFIT HOUSING
1. INTRODUCTION
Amendments to the National Housing Act (NHA) in 1973 were responsible
for the encouragement of housing developnents by non-profit groups and co-
operative societies--often referred to as the "third housing sector". The
encouragement of such housing developments was due to, in part, the discon-
tent with public housing and the inability of current government programs
to provide housing needed by the middle and low income families.
Before the 1973 NHA Amendments, non-profit housing was developed
primarily by charitable organizations, such as churches and various
sponsor service groups, for the elderly. Though the projects were subsi-
dized by government loans and mortgages, the rents were not supplemented
by government programs because they were low enough to be affordable by
the elderly. However, the inflation of the early 1970s made this impossible
since the elderly had to pay up to $100 a month in non-profit housing as
compared with paying about $40 a month in public housing. [ Canadian
Council on Social Development. A Review of Canadian Social Housing Policy.
Ottawa: CCSD, 1977. p.117.]
In comparison with the 'outside sponsored' non-profit housing,
the neighborhood based non-profit housing groups are expanding more rapidly
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as a component of the third sector. In addition to developing new
housing, neighborhood based citizens' groups are often involved with
housing rehabilitation. Other groups have been based on local trade
unions. Neighborhood based non-profit housing groups produce a
very desirable and flexible type of housing because it usually involves
local residents in planning and it is less rigidly structured than that pro-
duced and managed by public agencies. Third sector housing would be
less likely to be opposed by local residents and more accommodating to
neighborhood involvement in the developnent, planning, and management
aspects.
Co-operative housing societies, however, have been much slower
to develop because of the traditional reluctance of government agencies
to provide mortgage funding. In this country, there are two kinds
of co-operatives: "building " and -"continuing ".
Building co-operatives, a popular organization form in the Atlantic
provinces, follow the principles of co-operatives up to a certain point.
These building co-operatives are used for the collective construction of
houses, usually single family detached, which are owned individually by
the co-operative members. Although the group does work co-operatively
during the planning and construction phases, the co-operative organization
is dissolved, at some point, and private ownership occurs. Thus, this
form in reality is a form of private homeownership; its primary purpose
being to secure homes for members as economically as possible.
In Ontario, especially in large urban centers like Toronto, ,this
type of co-operatives has not been used because of the very high price of
land, and because of the fact that when public subsidy is required, co-
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operatives have to be 'continuing '. Continuing co-operatives are a form
of housing in which members jointly own the housing and occupy the homes
under a housing agreement. Thus, it is essentially a form of rental hous-
ing where the tenants are also the landlords.
Continuing co-operatives, usually with membership ranging from
20 to 25 households, construct or purchase some form of multiple housing.
Besides this differnce in membership (more members instead of fewer mem-
bers) and type of housing (multiple instead of single family detached),
the continuing co-operative is basically different from the building co-
operative in that the housing continues to be owned by the continuing
co-operative, even after the mortgage is paid. The resident never owns
his home outright but becomes part owner of the entire development.
In the past, there had been a gap between the non-profit companies
and the co-operative societies. Their differences in motivation, organiza-
tional management, and philosophies were reinforced by their institutional
bases. Non-profit companies were usually voluntary based associations,
including neighborhood citizens' groups, while the co-operative movement,
historically, had its base in the credit and trade unions.
However, since the NHA Amendments in 1973, these distinctions
have become less and less clear. The third sector groups are increasingly
bridging the gap, especially neighborhood citizens ' groups which often take
on both aspects of non-profit and co-operative, like DACHI. Even, the
public sector, like the City Non-profit Housing Corporation, has the charac-
teristics and the approach of private sponsor non-profit housing groups.
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2. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS & COMMITMENT
As a result of the 1973 NHA Amendments, there are four new programs
that directly relate to third sector housing. First, the Community
Housing Program provides 100% low-interest loans, a capital grant
equal to 10% of the appraised project value, and maximum $10,000 start-
up funds. Besides, the non-profit housing groups and the co-operative
organizations, community resource organizations that provide technical
expertise to the third sector housing groups are eligible for this
program.
Second, the Neighborhood Improvement Program (NIP) allows non-
profit and co-operative groups to carry out housing rehabilitation,
funded by the program, in an approved NIP area. Third, the Residential
Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP) authorizes rehabilitation loans
and subsidies to owner occupants, private landlords and non-profit groups.
Finally, Assistance Home Ownership Program (AHOP) allows building co-
operative members to apply for federal loans at 8% interest and an addi-
tional $600 forgivable loans.
In addition to the NHA programs, the federal and provincial levels
of government provide rent-to-income subsidies for a portion of co-
operative housing members. Since 1974, the federal government has
begun implementing a new land lease arrangement which makes co-operative
housing projects eligible for lease write-downs on federally owned land.
Another subsidy mechanism applicable to non-profit and co-operative housing
is the internal surcharge. The aim is to allow higher income tenants to
remain in non-profit housing projects even after their incomes are
too high. These tenants will be surcharged above the economic rents,
and these 'profits' are used to reduce the costs payable by other tenants.
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The Ontario Provincial government offers Rent Reduction Grants
of up to 10% of the project capital value. The grant is eligible to
the third sector if 25% of the project housing units are reserved for
rent supplement households. Since federal regulations require third sector
housing rents to be below private market rents, the grants are intended to
reduce rents to the acceptable level. But they are, in general, insufficient
because they reduce monthly rents by $20 to $35, depending on the project
size. [Canadian Council on Social Development. A Review of Canadian Social
Housing Policy. Ottawa: CCSD, 1977, p.1 2 0]
Though the Ontario government has supported third sector housing
(see Report of the Advisory Task Force on Housing Policy. Ottawa: Queen's
Printer for Onatrio, 1973), it has not provided a clear framework for set-
ting housing targets, not has it made available sufficient resources to
permit the third sector groups to implement their projects. The province
has yet to develop a resource program for third sector housing.
The etropolitan government has not shown any commitment to third
sector housing. The Metro Chairman, in fact, called for a serious re-
consideration of Metro role in housing:
In fact, the question arises as to whether, as municipalities,
we should be in the construction business at all, because as
long as we continue to build, we will be redistributing income
through housing subsidies and I suggest that is the function
of other levels of government. [City of Toronto Housing
Department. No Vacancy. 1979, p.22]
The position of the Metropolitan government on housing is, therefore, to
make effective use of existing housing and to encourage the private sector
to build additional family housing units, particularly rental units, that
are needed.
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3. NON-PROFIT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS
The co-operative organizations that will be discussed belong to the
continuing type, as described earlier. In contrast to the non-profit
sponsor organizations, such as church or other charitable groups, which
can continue to develop federally funded non-profit housing projects, the
co-operatives are not permitted to do so by government stipulations. More-
over, co-operative housing organizations are required to have residents
for at least 50% of the housing units before a mortgage commitment can be
issued by the federal government agency. Thus, in essence, continuing
co-operative housing is a 'one shot* attempt and whatever expertise and
skills co-operative members may have acquired cannot be used to develop
other co-operatives.
Though non-profit co-operative housing organizations plan and
develop their projects through all phases, they depend entirely on
federal start-up funds and mortgage loans. Many observers have been
critical of the nature of this relationship. (1) Central Mortgage and
Housing Corporation (CMHC), the federal government agency administering
the NHA programs, expects rents in co-operative housing to be affordable
to low income families. But it ignores the benefits of stable rents
and low occupancy charges co-operatives provide. (2) CMHC high housing
standards which push up construction and material costs often become one
of the chief obstacles for co-operative organizations to develop projects
acceptable to CMHC within the mortgage constraints. (3) Delays of
construction mortgage from CMHC pose serious problems for paying services
in time. (4) In formulating the project financial package, co-operative
members are expected to spend a large proportion of their income on rent
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and price of land. (Christopher Haire. In Want of a Policy. Ottawa:
Canadian Council on Social Development, 1975. pp.40-41.]
A similar conclusion was reached by the community housing division
of CMHC:
Unless CMHC makes efforts to make the programs more econom-
ically viable and the process less arbitrary, capable people
will continue to be lost to the [third sector] movement
and new groups will continually start from the very beginning.
[ Louis Clarke. Twelve Community Housing Groups Profiles.
Ottawa: CMHC, 1975. p.2]
Policy and resource contraints on the development of co-operative housing
also seriously affect the organization structure, and therefore, the
capability of housing co-operatives. Empirical research shows that
less than 50% of co-operative groups had any support staff (see C.Haire.
op.cit.), and for those groups which had support staff, it was unusual
for more than two people to be employed on each project. Furthermore,
staff that worked in co-operative groups were paid out of other government
grant programs, such as Local Initiative Program (LIP), Company of Young
Canadians (CYC), etcetera.
The problems most encountered by co-operative groups focused on
three areas. First, planning and financing phase; second, land and build-
ing acquisition; and third, organization maintenance. All of these problems
were directly related to the lack of staff expertise, the lack of front-end
development capital, and most important, the lack of available housing
stock in central areas in the cities. Furthermore, these problems were
and still are aggravated by the large amount fo funds required for special-
ist services.
Average start-up grants requested were about $7,000 (1973-75),
average grants of $5,500 were given out to these groups. The majority
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of co-operative groups found it impossible to develop acceptable proposals
in an inflated housing market. Though federal loans for co-operative
and non-profit housing groups had increased from some $102 million
to $323 million in the period from 1973 to 1976, a high percentage of
the loans was targetted for senior citizen projects. [CMHC Annual Report
Ottawa: CMHC, 1978. pp. 74-75.] For example, Haire found that 70% of
the funds committed in 1974 were for elderly housing. [C. Haire. op.cit.,
p. 3.]
The private non-profit and co-operative housing reached a record
high of 3,000 units in 1973 in Toronto, but by 1978 it dropped to 550 units
(separate data for each of these groups are not available). While, during
the same period, the City non-profit organization increased its output
from 850 units to 1,000 units. The following table illustrates this
change between the private non-profit and co-operative housing on the one
hand and the City non-profit rental on the other.
Third Sector Housing 1973 to 1978
in the City of Toronto
Private Non-profit City Non-profit
& Co-operatives
1973 3,000 units* -
1974 2,000 * 850
1975 600 200
1976 1,400 850
1977 950 100
1978 550 1,000
8,500 3,000
Source: City of Toronto City Housing Reports 1976-1979.
* over 50% of these units were built for senior citizens
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4. CITY NON-PROFIT RENTAL HOUSING
The City set up a non-profit housing corporation in 1974 to buy and
renovate existing housing in addition to building new housing for moderate
and low income families. In its first two years, the corporation concen-
trated on acquiring and rehabilitating existing units. At the end of 1975,
it had about 1,300 units under management. About 1,100 units were for
moderate and low income families (20% of them were mother-led families
receiving benefits allowances). The remaining 200 units houses single
people, mostly in the Cabbagetown area of Toronto. By the end of 1977,
just over 1,400 units had been acquired by the City at a total cost of
$32.7 million. The average price was $38,000 plus an average renovation
cost of $6,500. [City of Toronto Housing Department. On Target. 1978, p.21]
Market and city non-profit rents for 1976 are compared below:
Private Market City non-profit
Rents Rents
Rooms - $70-90
Bachelor $211 167
1 bedroom 235-243 183-190
2 bedroom 261-302 193-215
3 bedroom 311-373 217-246
Source: City of Toronto Housing Department
Housing Policy Review 1976. p. 147.
Comparing the upper range of the two types of rents, the City non-profit
rents constituted substantial savings--representing some 78%, 72%, and
66% of the market rents for the 1 bedroom, 2 bedroom, and 3 bedroom respect-
ively. Of the units approved for rent supplement in 1976, about half of the
approved tenants were working class families. To date, rent supplement has
195-201 Logan
Harcourt/Cavell
Frankel/Lambert
111 Stephenson
Winchester Square
BerkeleylQueen
Wales Avenue
Chatham
Trefann Court
AsquitblPark Road
"P
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not been used to subsidize rooming house tenants.
The City corporation shifted its emphasis away from rehabilitation
to new development by 1976, mainly for two primary reasons. First, the
costs of rehabilitation, in order to meet the federal housing standards,
were extremely high. Second, it was difficult to find existing housing
stock at reasonable price in inner city areas. As the emphasis was shifted
to new development, acquisition of existing housing fell drastically from
some 330 units in 1976 to 70 units in 1977. In 1976, some 350 units
had been built by the City at a cost of $11.8 million. From 1974-78,
the City built about 1,110 units at a capital cost of $35 million.
[City of Toronto Housing Department. On Target. 1978, p. 19]
The City landbanking program has been a crucial instrument for the
corporation's attempts to assemble government and non-government owned
land for building non-profit housing and leasing land to co-operative
groups to develop their own projects. During 1973-77, 75 acres intended for
6,000 planned housing units, had been acquired at a total cost of $33.5
million. However, the federal government terminated the landbanking program
in 1979 and this implies that the City's own program will slow down as
soon as sites already assembled are exhausted.
Critical to the City corporation has been cutback in federal govern-
ment loans and commitments during the period from 1976 to 1978. Also non-
profit co-operative housing has been equally affected. The following table
shows the reduction of federal loans in those three years in relation to
non-profit co-operative housing, non-profit housing, and land assembly pro-
grams.
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CMHC
Commitments for Loans
and Investments
Co-operatives Non-profit Land Assembly
Corporations Loans
1976 $40.3 $288 $64.2
1977 $62.8 $157.4 $33
1978 $36.9 $120 $31
$ in millions
Source: CMHC Annual Report 1979.
The data clearly shows more than 50% cutback of federal funding (from
1976 to 1978) for the two items "non-profit corporations" and "land assembly
loans" adversely affected the City corporation's delivery capability. As
described earlier, in the period from 1976 to 1977, the City corporation's
acquisition program dropped from 332 to 70 units; new housing program
from 355 to 10 units; and Land Banking program from 1,145 to 42 planned
units.
In addition to the financial and funding constraints on the City's
programs, officials see three main problems with the operation of the
City program in general. First, the requirements for interim funding do
not match with the payment schedules of CHMC. Second, because of program
stipulations, there has been pressure exerted on the corporation to increase
the proportion of rent supplement tenants. Finally, keeping track of the
vast amount of information needed by federal and provincial programs has
significantly increased the amount of workload.
Although there are tenants from all income levels, there is a large
proportion of tenants from the lower income levels. To integrate projects
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into local neighborhoods, there is a policy of giving priority to local
residents in filling half of the housing units. The City corporation is
strongly committed to the idea of integrated housing, primarily made avail-
able to below medium income tenants. A minimum of 25% of all units will
be available to rent supplement tenants.
The reasons for the effectiveness of the City corporation are not
difficult to understand. The corporation can draw on the technical skills
and other resources of various city departments. It has no operating
budget problems since the budget is being absorbed by the taxpayers. The
relationship between elected representatives and city officials, all of
whom have the responsibility to carry out the City's housing mandate,
helps to ensure an efficient process for the implementation of the City's
policy.
5. THE DELIVERY SYSTEM OF NON-PROFIT RENTAL & NON-PROFIT CO-OPERATIVE
HOUSING
Except for the City corporation, most non-profit organizations are an inde-
pendent effort, with few of them having built more than one project. In the
case of non-profit co-operatives, all of them are restricted to building
one co-operative because 'mother co-operatives' are not allowed by the
program stipulations. In this way, while private sponsor non-profit rental
corporations may continue to expand their skill and expertise in housing
development, the non-profit co-operatives cannot. In contrast to these
organizations, the City corporation has many advantages such as profession-
ally trained personnel, 'in-house' expertise, resources, etcetera. Because
of the difference in their organizational structure, the scale and scope
of development these organizations undertake are significantly different.
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For example, the City corporation acquires and renovates existing housing,
develops new housing projects, and assembles land for planned housing
development, whereas, co-operatives concentrate on rehabilitation.
Moreover, federal funding priorities strongly indicate that among
the third sector groups, the non-profit rental corporations are more
preferrable to the non-profit co-operatives. Funding for the first group
is usually three times of that for the second group. For example,
in 1978, funding for non-profit corporations constituted 10% of CMHC
total budget, and funding for co-operatives represented 3%. [ CMHC Annual
Report 1979. pp. 74-75]
A workshop, sponsored by the Canadian Council on Social Development
in December 1973, discussed problems associated with the third sector
delivery capability. It identified the major obstacles to growth were
found in prevalent public attitudes which focused on individually owned
private property as the goal around which housing should be developed, in
the way that governments over the past 25 years had structured incentives
to promote private market housing and provincial public housing. (Christo-
pher Haire. In Want of a Policy. Ottawa:CCSD, 1975, p. XI]
The delivery system of the third sector( City non-profit, private
non-profit, and co-operative housing) depends on access to a stable source
of mortgage funds that will enable it to meet its growing involvement in
moderate and low income housing. This is particularly critical now, in
view of recent cutback on federal funding. Although both the private
non-profit housing groups and co-operatives are dependent on the succesful
search for front-end development capital and long-term mortgage funds, the
co-operatives are more vulnerable to these problems because they do not have
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an organizational structure to sustain them in the process of searching
for capital. For example, a private non-profit group sponsored by a
charitable organization usually has some funds to sustain it until
the front-end development capital is available.
Under the category of non-profit and co-operative third sector
housing, evidence presented in this chapter indicates that co-operatives
have the weakest capability in the delivery system, that the City corpor-
ation has the strongest, and that private non-profit sponsor housing groups
are in the middle range.
6. SUMMARY
The summary reiterates the major points made in the Background study and
also in light of a better understanding of third sector housing organiza-
tions raises some questions that the thesis will illuminate.
Prior to 1973, the boundaries between the public and third sectors
were defined. Within the third sector, non-profit housing groups sponsored
by charitable organizations built housing for the elderly. These groups
were usually 'outside' based. Also within the third sector, co-operatives
consisted of 'building' and 'continuing' types.
After the 1973 NHA Amendments, the boundaries became diffused. The
public sector, such as the City corporation, has taken up the role of
non-profit housing organizations. Private non-profit groups, predomin-
antly 'outside' based groups before, now formed organizations within local
communities. Co-operative groups, since 1973, have become non-profit,
'continuing', and community based organizations.
Funding priorities, program stipulations, and federal and provincial
policies shape and define the technical delivery capability of the different
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non-profit groups which, in turn, affect the production of the different
types of housing in inner-city neighborhoods--the non-profit rental
housing and the non-profit co-operative housing.
In the City of Toronto, the City non-profit housing increased at
a very fast rate after 1974 when the City corporation began to engage it-
self in three aspects of production: renovation, building, and land assem-
bly. Both private non-profit housing and co-operative housing began to
shrink in production volume, especially after 1976.
Because of the various organizational, funding, and policy constraints,
non-profit co-operative organizations have the least capability in produc-
ing co-operative housing. In contrast, the organizational structure,
funding priorities, and policy instruments enhance the City non-profit rental
housing. The City corporation has the most efficient delivery system.
Private non-profit housing groups, especially those sponsored by 'outside'
organizations occupy the middle range in terms of the delivery system.
The thesis focuses on the non-profit co-operative organizations
and the City non-profit housing corporation. In light of these findings,
several questions need to be explored in conjunction to the central ques-
tions outlined in the Introduction. The rest of the thesis, on the basis
of examination and analysis of the two case studies, will illuminate these
questions and other issues that surface in the process of the study.
1. In what manner and to what extent does the diversity of the
neighborhoods' socio-economic setting affect the delivery capability
of the two organizations?
2. Does an institutional based organization affect the decision
making and planning processes differently than would a community based
organization? What are the factors involved that can account for the
difference, if it exists?
27
3. In what manner the size and types of project affect the
the. delivery capability of the two organizations? Which of the projects
developed by the two organizations is more responsive to residents' needs?
4. How do the organizations structure and develop the planning
framework in which the residents can share control over the development?
5. To what extent does each of the organization adapt its goals
to the demands of the interest groups with which it is negotiating?
6. In terms of either non-profit co-operative housing or non-
profit rental housing, how do the residents participate in the decison
making and control of the housing projects? Which type of housing is
more intrumental in giving the residents more satisfaction in managing
their own environment?
7. In resolving neighborhood interests, is the delivery capabil-
ity or the institutional base of organizations sufficient?
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CHAPTER TWO: DACHI - CASE STUDY I
1. INTRODUCT ION
In a community just one mile east of downtown Toronto, 33 houses consist-
ing of some 60 units ranging from single rooms to five bedroom units are
now owned by low and moderate income families who are members of the
Don Vale Co-operative Housing Incorporation (DACHI). This project
came to fruition despite strenuous opposition from within the community--
groups that wanted to keep out the moderate and low income renters.
DACHI project was given incentives provided by the 1973 amendments to the
National Housing Act (NHA) which provided start-up funds and federal
mortgage loan for co-operatives and non-profit housing. A change in
the NHA reflected the general discontent with the past government subsi-
dized public housing.
DACHI was one of the more ambitious co-operative projects; others
are usually involved with renovation of one or two units. The controversy
surrounding DACHI gave insights into the difficulties and the political
obstacles that co-operatives have to overcome. Other co-operatives
had less resources and support that DACHI had enjoyed. Despite that, DACHI
was not successful in implementing the whole project; thirty six new in-fill
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three-bedroom units that would have been built were stopped by the
political forces at the provincial cabinet level.
The critical issues in the DACHI case revolved around class conflict
among community groups; and among politicians at the city, provincial
levels of government. The DACHI proposal polarized these interest groups
into-opposing camps, and the processes involved took on a magnified
dimension, and , in effect, became a political issue. The evolution
of the NHA concerning co-operatives and non-profit housing has been
discussed in the previous chapter. In 1973, when DACHI first started,
the NHA provided a start-up grant up to $10,000 maximum, a government
loan equal to the 100% of the appraised value of the project, and a
grant equal to 10% of the appraised value. Even after the law's
passage, the central agency CMHC administering the NHA was reluctant
in helping the co-operative and non-profit housing groups. This relation-
ship between CMHC and co-operative groups, as evidenced in the DACHI case,
became a source of concern especially in areas of funding, and the
manner in which projects were appraised.
2. OVERVIEW
The DACHI's project is located in Cabbagetown or Don Vale as the planners
call it. The neighborhood is bordered by the Don River and parklands to
the east; the Regent Park Public Housing projects of the early 1960s
to the south; Parliament Street, a busy commercial street to the south;
and the St. James Cemetery to the north. Cabbagetown contains some 1,800
houses most of which were built between 1870 and 1900. The majority of
the houses are quite small and were constructed for the working class
immigrants who arrived in the 1830s.
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In the 1890s the Toronto Hospital with its medical schools and
physicians' offices dominated this area and provided the focus of a
growing institutional community. During the time of Depression, immi-
grants from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean filled the residential
vacuum created by the mass exodus of the richer immigrants of the earlier
period. The second generation families of the original British immigrants
remained the majority of the population.
The population has been decreasing from 8,700 (1961) to 7,600
(1971) and to 6,500 (1976). The decrease is significant because it sig-
nifies a critical change in the demographics of the neighborhood--the
smaller and richer families who began to settle in that community in the
early 1970s. In 1971, 72% of the population were family persons living
in private households, but in 1976, it was 64%. The majority of the popu-
lation were dependent on inexpensive accommodation largely on a rental
rather than ownership basis. For example, in 1971, 60% of the Cabbagetown
population were renters as compared to the City's 18%. In 1976, it was
52% as against the City's 15%. [Population, Household and Family Charac-
teristics by Census Tracts. Census Metropolitan Area of Toronto, 1961,
1971, and 1976]
Many of the people who live in relatively low-cost houses in the
central parts of the cities, like Toronto, have long had a stable and secure
relationship with their landlords. For example, in the early 1970s, this
situation continued in some parts of Cabbagetown in the Wellesley Cottages
off Wellesley Street built in the 1850s by an owner who intended to rent
them for income. (James Lorimer. The Real World of City Politics. James
Lewis & Samuel, Toronto, 1970, p.80.]
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However, instability in the real estate market created by specula-
tion and by public projects and urban renewal development have put an
end to this informal arrangement between the landlord and long-term
tenants. [J.Lorimer. Op. cit., pp.80-81]
From 1961 to 1971, the average family income increased by 200%
in Cabbagetown, but it was still much below that of the metropolitan
level. For example, in 1961 it was about $4,000 in Cabbagetown, as
compared with $5,800 in Metro; and in 1971 it was $8,300 (Cabbagetown)
as against $11,850 in Metro.
During the same period, 50% of the Cabbagetown population earned
less than $3,000 per year, while 29% of the city population had similar
income. But in 1971, only 24% of the Cabbagetown population had similar
income as compared with the City's 26%. This change implies either that
the population in Cabbagetown, in general, earned a higher income in that
period or that some higher income families had already moved into the
area. [Census Income Distributions by Census Tracts, 1961 and 1971]
Some 80% of the population are blue collar workers engaged in
the production and manufacturing trades. This figure remained constant
from 1961 to 1971, while in the same period, the City's blue collar workers
increased from 17% to 20%. But after the early 1970s, Cabbagetown wit-
nessed the gradual exodus of a great number of blue collar workers and an
influx of the richer middle class professionals.
Urban Renewal
The 1969 urban renewal scheme--a rehabilitation rather than an expro-
priation type--made Cabbagetown stand out as one of the few stable old neigh-
borhoods for the next few decades. The scheme promoted the preservation
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of the community. Though the scheme was not implemented because of
federal cut-back on urban renewal funds, the area residents saw the
net result not as a victory for the area or as the development of political
power for the neighborhood. Rather it appeared to them to be at best
stalemate or "simply a delay of the day of reckoning".[Lorimer. The
Working People. p. 104]
The reasons for that seemed to reflect the impact of middle class
townhouse redevelopment and rehabilitation was less disrupting
than public housing or private highrise. But for the working class
people in the area the end result is not so different--persistent and
gradual displacement until the real estate market is stabilized.
The coming of the middle-class families to the area exerted pressures
which develop a kind of genteel blockbusting not. the terrorism used
by developers.
After the urban renewal designation was lifted, housing prices
spiralled. Rooming houses were shut down and their tenants evicted
as owners found more and more people willing to pay higher and higher
prices to turn them into single-family townhouses. Real estate agents,
involved with conversion in Cabbagetown, stressed that the houses
were loaded with potential for townhouse concersion or that they were
"rehabilitation special".
In a comparatively short period of time, the whitpainting process
had turned Cabbagetown the sought-after real estate market in Toronto.
One house (unrenovated) in 1969 would cost $29,000-$30,000, but in
1975 after some $30,000-35,000 renovation, it would fetch some $120,000.
[Interview with R.Shiomi, a Cabbagetown resident. January 7, 1980]
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3. DACHI: EVOLUTION & STRUCTURE
In 1972, seven neighborhood groups in the Don Area formed the Federation
of Don Area Residents' Associations (FODARA). The Associations set up
a housing committee to study the housing problems in the community.
The report, produced by the committee, found that there was inadequate
housing for the working class families in the area; that many absentee
landlords neglected their property; and that there was a lack of legisla-
tion dealing with the housing situation. The housing committee, having
fulfilled its function, disbanded.
Later in the same year, the three levels of government began to
introduce changes in the housing legislature. The National Housing Act
Amendments were being considered by the federal government; the Ontario
Province set up its own housing task force; and the City had a housing
work group formulating housing policies.
FODARA, in anticipation of the new legislature, decided to seek out
interested residents to form a separate housing corporation. By June 1973,
the FODARA community organizer had formed a group interested in producing
non-profit housing in the Don Area. The group consisted of the community
organizer, a planner, a lawyer, and a 'scientific' consultant. In July,
the group established a board of directors--ten people who lived and
worked in Cabbagetown--and named the organization as the Don Area Co-
operative Homes Inc. (DACHI). By the end of July, the federal start-up
grant of some $9,000 arrived.
The membership in the co-operative is open to anyone who is in agree-
ment with co-operative objectives. Members can withdraw from the co-op
whenever they like. Co-operative members had to occupy 80% of the housing
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units. The board of directors must meet, at least, once every three
months. The ten directors elected annually by the co-operative members
are responsible for the operation and management of the co-operative
housing. A director can be ousted from the board without notice if
that director misses three consecutive meetings.
Ownership & Management of DACHI
DACHI is a corporate entity set up under the Corporation Act of
Ontario as a corporation without share capital. There are no shareholders,
but members of the corporation have full control over its operations.
Under the Corporation Act, memberatenants elect from among themselves
a board of 10 directors. Each member-tenant is limited to one vote.
Federal program stipulations require a fund to be set aside for major
repairs and replacements, specify a standard of maintenance, and allow the
co-operative to be run only on a non-profit basis. An audit is required
by law to prepare the co-operative accounts.
Although the terms of federal financing encourage co-operative to
provide for low income tenants, people with higher income can live in the
project (up to 25% of the units) by paying 10% surcharge. Member-tenants
have no ownership or equity in their homes. If the co-operative does
not continue, it is prohibited by its own letter patent from distributing
the units to the member-tenants. The proceeds of their sale or the project
itself must go to a charity.
The daily affairs of the co-op would be managed by officers and
employees, elected or appointed by the board of directors and their salar-
ies will be set by the board. The officers can be removed by the board.
Existing by-laws prohibit directors from drawing fees from the co-operative.
37
4. DACHI'S PROPOSAL
In September 1973, DACHI decided to get a CMHC loan of $40,000 to
buy and renovate 10 houses scattered throughout Don Area, and prepared
a document describing the area, the project planned, and the renovations
required -on these 10 houses. But it discovered that a large Don Vale
site consisting of 36 houses and land suitable for in-fill housing were
changing hands. The whole assembly is known as "the Cowley Houses".
The new owners had planned to renovate them and build the in-fill.
Through the local residents' association, the Don Vale Association of
Homeowners and Residents (DVAHAR), DACHI approached the new owners.
The arrangement with the realtor was that the option had to be signed
on December 6, 1973. The price for the property was $1.6 million which
included the $1.375 million the owners had paid for it, the $150,000 profit,
and the $750,000 renovating contract. DACHI was to pick up the option by
February 5, 1974 with a payment of $5,000, and to close the deal by paying
the balance by March 5, 1974.
December 5, 1973 Meeting
The day before signing the option, DACHI presented the proposal
before a general meeting of DVAHAR. The results of the meeting were that
DACHI's plans required further study, that a committee was to be set up
to look into them, and that the report should be presented to the next
general meeting on January 15, 1973. A 7-member committee was formed
consisting of those who reacted favorably to it, those who reacted
unfavorably to it, and those who were unsure. Its instructions were to
study DACHI's proposal and other alternatives for the Cowley Houses.
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January 15, 1974 General Meeting
More than 450 people attended the meeting to discuss DACHI's non-
profit housing co-operative for the area. Citizen participation had
shaped the direction of urban renewal in their area and they were equally
determined to use their opinions to decide the success or failure of
DACHI's plan. The gap between the different views that the residents
had of their community became crystallized at the meeting.
Basically DACHI's proposal included renovating 36 existing
houses and constructing 36 in-fill townhouses within the block bounded
by Carlton Street, Dermott Place, Spruce and Parliament Streets.
The in-fill housing would be built on Dermott Place now used as open
parking. The unit mix and the rents proposed for both the renovated and
the in-fill housing consisted of the following:
Unit Mix Rent/month
56 rooms $99
18 mini 1-BR $130
11 1-BR $155
12 2-BR $180
9 3-BR
9 4-BR ($225-250)
7 5-BR
122 units
36 3-BR $250
158 units (total)
The annual income ranges to be served by DACHI proposal were between
$3,200 and $4,300 for the rooms, and between $8,800-$1l,700 for the new
townhouses. These figures represented a rent/income ratio of 33-25%.
The monthly income for DACHI would be those shown in the table above.
The present residents of the Cowley Houses would be given priority for
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membership in an attempt to cause as little dislocation as possible.
The total project would cost $2.8 million, and DACHI was seeking
funding from the federal government. The government would finance
the entire project, and give a grant subsidy of $2,500 per apartment and
$1,000 per self-contained room. The remainder of $2.4 million would be
loans (at 8% interest over 40 years). Tenants in the project would
function collectively as their own landlord, but they would have no
equity in the co-operative.
The proposal would provide housing for 414 persons and it represented
some 176 persons per acre. The density is comparable with other low-
rise high density developments in other parts of the city. If the density
was reduced by 20%, the rents would rise 4%. The present zoning by-law
would allow the in-fill. The total government mortgage of $2.4 million,
together with the grant subsidy and the residential rehabilitation grants
made up a total project cost of $2.8 million.
5. PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
DACHI presented the proposal at the general meeting on January 15, 1974.
The Don Vale Property Owners Association (DVPOA) and the Don Vale Neigh-
borhood Action Committee (DVNAC) strongly objected to the proposal mainly
for the following seven reasons:
(1) the project would bring "subsidized" housing into the area;
(2) it would frustrate the middle-class renovators by "stuffing
too many people into this neighborhood, it will turn into
slum again"; [Dineen. The Trouble with Co-op. p.27]
(3) DACHI plan could not provide housing for low-income people;
(4) the project was a "socialist concept" to be imposed on the area;
(Dineen. op.cit., p. 29]
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(5) the project was being railroaded through without prior
community involvement;
(6) the project would reduce the community needed open space; and
(7) DACHI housing had no equity--the tenants would not upkeep it.
DACHI countered these arguments by explaining that (1) the
proposal would have lower rents over a period of time than any private
developnent. A bachelor unit renting for $147 a month in a nearby
highrise would rent for $99 a month in the DACHI houses; (2) DACHI
would be the only way to provide housing for families with moderate
incomes in the Don Vale area; (3) CMHC controlled the quality of the
rehabilitation and the construction, and therefore, the project could
not turn into a slum; (4) the proposal wasn 't railroaded through because
DACHI had discussed with DVAHAR even before signing up for the option
and DVAHAR had set up a committee to look into the project; and (5)
Don Vale had large parkland to the east.
Support came from other various sources. The ward alderman supported
the plan because Cabbagetown was a good area for family housing--close
to schools, parks, and public transportation. The area school trustee
indicated that DACHI would bring needed students back to the school.
A community worker for a nearby resource center argued that DACHI
represented the last opportunity for people to rent in the Cabbagetown
area to provide a mix of people desirable for the community. A member
of the DVAHAR's committee set up to look into the DACHI proposal
commented that DACHI co-op would blend easily into the community and
would be planned with the help of the residents.
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DACHI'S proposal was scheduled to go before the City Council
Executive Committee the next day, and if the residents voted for it,
then DACHI could have more support at the City Hall. If the majority
voted against DACHI, it would be much more difficult to seek approval
from the city and a loan from CMHC. Finally the meeting came to a
close vote of 198 in favor of DACHI and 158 against. ~
6. INTEREST GROUPS
Evidence of friction over the Cabbagetown s future can be found as
early as the 1960s when the urban renwal plan was being formulated.
The urban renewal process precipitated conflicting interest between
two main groups in the community: First, the stability-oriented faction
and second, the redevelopment-oriented faction. [Lorimer: The Real World
of City Politics. p.100]. Though both factions agreed that urban renewal
should not use expropriation means to acquire land and houses, both
differed on the means for stabilizing the area.
The stability-oriented faction, represented by the residents' asso-
ciation, DVHARA, wanted existing housing for the working class so that
residents could stay. It rejected the assumption that total redevelopment
for the area was inevitable, instead it proposed rehabilitation phased
out gradually in a period of time.
The redevelopnent faction accepted the assumption that the area
would be torn down and built again, and that the private sector rather than
the city should do the development. In this way, the present owners
of the properties in the area would bid at the current market rate.
This group was chiefly represented by the Don Vale Property Owners Associa-
tion (DVPOA).
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In Cabbagetown, the major group is the DVAHAR which has several
canmon features shared by other major groups in other urban renewal
areas. First, membership is open to all homeowners and residents;
second, a president and an executive group keep in touch with what is
happening at City Hall and meet together regularly; third, executive officers
are elected annually at an open public meeting; fourth, executive group
make their decisions by majority votes; and fifth, the president has
no special authority.
However, the opposition groups such as the DVPOA have different
characteristics. First, executives, one to four people, are self-appointed;
second, they make association policy as they wish; third, members of these
groups may turn out to be residents who have signed a petition earlier on
supporting the basic position of the executive group; fourth, public
meetings are rarely held; fifth, members are asked to endorse whatever
the executives' views are at the time; sixth, dissenting members are
generally thrown out; and seventh, the structure is run from the top down.
[Lorimer: op.cit., pp. 62-63]
In 1973, re-kindled by the ' up-filtering' process and cauterized
by the DACHI issue, the community division manifested itself in three
groups each upholding values and goals about the future of Cabbagetown.
The progressive group consisting of the members of the DVAHAR and DACHI
articulated the needs of the moderate and low income families. This
group wanted housing for the lower income families as a means to stabilize
Cabbagetown. Within this group members of DACHI became the leading force.
The progressives had the support from the two aldermen both of whom had
fought hard for the low-income families evicted by urban renewal in another
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part of the ward's political boundaries. Because of the aims of DACHI
which were in line with the housing policies the city was setting up, the
progressive faction had the support at the municipal level. The Federation
of Don Area Residents Association--the mother organization of all coalition
residents' groups--gave its support.
The moderate group consisted of some of the recent residents who
could profit from the whitepainting process but remained in the area.
This group was quite sympathetic towards keeping the existing low income
families, yet it also realized that by -stopping the whitepainting process,
it might hurt the investment that members of this group owned. To this
group, middle-class renters who desired to stay in Cabbagetown gave their
support. However, because of the lack of committment, this group had no
organization, and their views could be swayed one way or the other depending
on circumstances. Yet, the progressive group needed the support of this
amorphous group.
The conservatives consisted of long-time homeowners and the new
affluent middle-class professionals. Their investments, as they saw it,
were at stake because of DACHI. Property owners living closest to
the Cowley Houses were the most forceful advocates for keeping the low
income families out. The members of this group, thus, held a set of values
and goals opposite to those of the progressives. This group leaned towards
the support of private market activities, and the extraordinary rate
of market investment pouring into Cabbagetown was an -indication of their
shrewdness and profits. The displacement of the moderate and low income
families, as a consequence of market investment symbolized "the neighborhood
has pulled itself up by its bootstraps".(DVPOA letter dated Jan 12,1974]
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The conservatives had two associations: DVPOA and DVNAC. The property
owners' association, with its self-appointed president, represented some
long-time homeowners whose assets were spiralling. DVNAC consisted of young
professional newcomers who came to Cabbagetown to start their homes in
a downtown environment, to renovate their houses, and to stay or to
sell them a few years later at the inflationary rate the market could bear.
As much as the spokesmen of DVPOA used old long-winded rhetorics to
proclaim the community for their own middle-class renovators, the spokesmen
of DVNAC used sophisticated rational expertise and political strategies
to proclaim the same thing for the same purpose. The conservatives
had been supporters and campaigners for the Progressive Conservative party
Their riding 's Provincial Member of Parliament became their strong
advocate at the provincial level of government.
7. POLITICAL OPPOSITION & STRATEGIES
As the divisions became crystallized, opposing interest groups began to
mobilize their constituency, each seeking to articulate its cause and
to influence the decision-making mechanisms at the community, city,
provincial, and federal levels. Between the two general meetings (Decem-
ber 5, 1973-January 15, 1974), the president of DVNAC who used to
be a member of the DVHAPA 's comittee looking into the DACHI's proposal
took a series of actions to forstall the DACHI group. First, only a week
after the first general meeting, in December, a night letter signed with
some 50 names was sent to eight politicians at the city, provincial and
federal levels, and the top officials of CMHC. In it, the main line
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of argument was that the present owners of the Cowley Houses were start-
ing to renovate the houses, when DACHI approached them and paid them a
profit out of federal public funds. All politicians ignored the telegram
except for the riding's Member of Parliament, who immediately responded.
Second, unhappy with the general response, DVNAC sent another telegram,
signed with some 30 names, to the federal Member of Pariliament (Liberal
Party) and accused DACHI proposed to pay the owners a profit of $150,000--
in excess of 100% after two months--with public federal funds in order to
turn the properties into a co-operative project. (J.Dineen. op. cit. ,p.81]
What this implied was a deal between DACHI and the new owners--a
deal from which both parties could benefit in some way at the expense of
the general public. DVNAC, thus, attempted to get political support by
sheer misrepresentation of the facts, and by playing on the fears of
homeowners who wanted to protect the market value of their investments.
Third, once contact was made with the riding's Provincial Member of
Parliament, DVNAC was given the campaign office for its use as the opposi-
tion headquarters. The politician asked her campaign manager to be the
opposition's organizer. Fourth, by January 5, 1974, the campaign manager
had formulated strategies for opposing DACHI. Within the next ten days,
the opposition canvassed the entire neighborhood for support, and received
some 500 names of those who would come to the general meeting on January,
15, 1974. Because of the MPP's position as the parliamentary assistant
to Ontario's Housing Minister, she represented a strong and dangerous force.
DACHI had the support of the ward aldermen with whom the MPP had conflict-
ing views. Recognizing this, DACHI arranged to meet with the MPP in the
hope that by clarifying DACHI's aims and explaining the details of
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the DACHI proposal to her, she might change her mind. There was some
validity in thinking along this line because the MPP was one of the
members of the Provincial Advisory Task Force on Housing Policy which
recommended government encouragement and support for non-profit and
co-operative housing. A meeting was arranged one week before the
general meeting, but the results were negative.
8. APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL
At the City Council Executive Committee meeting, the two opposition
groups, DVNAC and DVPOA presented the same objections as those in the
community's general meeting: lack of open space; over-crowded slums;
sub-standard development; and DACHI as " a new menance that confronts us...
to which we are utterly and absolutely opposed." [DVPOA 's letter dated
Jan. 12,1974, appended in the Don Area Co-operative Home Inc. 1974,
City of Toronto Planning Board].
They asked for another community meeting before the city made its
decision. This request was significant for two reasons. First, the
executive committee's approval, and consequently the council's approval
could have been delayed to the point past the CMHC executive meeting
scheduled on January 24. That CMHC meeting would help DACHI to decide
whether or not to pick up the option. Second, the opposition groups
could again mobilize their support and tried to vote out the proposal.
The Mayor, whom the MPP had spoken to just before the meeting,
was not in favor of approving the recommendations of the City Planning
Board before the actual recommendations were presented to the community
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in a special meeting. DACHI pointed out that the last CHMC executive meet-
ing before the option deadline (February 5), was scheduled for January 24.
After heated arguments concerning the Major's suggestion, a new motion
was drafted indicating city's support for DACHI to get CMHC funding.
Between the Executive Committee's meeting and the Council's meeting,
DVNAC approached a pro-development alderman and asked him to be a spokes-
man for DVNAC and all those who opposed the co-operative porject.
Council's Meeting
On January 23, 1974, the DACHI proposal was scheduled on the Council's
agenda for debate between 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. The alderman questioned the
procedure by which the Council was asked to approve a development that had
never gone through the Planning Board or the Development Committee. He
suggested the Council should be following the normal process for approving
developnent proposals. Three other aldermen joined to question the pro-
posal until Council's adjournment at 11 p.m.
The next morning, the alderman speaking for Dachi's opposition
made a motion to send the proposal back to the Building Committee.
[Committee minutes date January 24, 1974] The implication would be that
it would delay CMHC funding and outrun the option date. One other alderman
made a motion that a financial study should be done before the Council
would approve the proposal. Another alderman suggested the City should
buy the land to provide housing for low-income families. The last motion
seemed to be an alternative, but if it was approved, DACHI would lose the
properties and the city would not necessarily end up buying the houses at
all.
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The Council voted on those three motions: to refer back to the
Committee; to defer it for financial study; and to ask the city to buy
the properties. All these three were defeated. The Council carried
the Executive Committee's recommendations.
DVNAC complained that the Mayor had stood for election on the basis
of neighborhood integrity and the ward's aldermen on neighborhood
participation, and both had abandoned neighborhoods to the open
attack of developers.
9. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
After the CMHC loan of $1.6 million to DACHI came in February,, 1974,
DACHI mobilized the community for input into the project. It organized
block meetings to elect two residents from each block to form a working
committee which was to keep the residents informed of the development
of the project and to generate feedback from the residents.
Aside from a few tenants who were trying to put together a
Cowley tenants' committee, however, the majority of the residents was still
not invovled. The block meetings were poorly attended. In March, 1974 ,
the opposition group DVNAC submitted several names for election to the
working committee. DACHI and DVAHAR finally formed a 20-member committee
representing the different interest groups in the community. The working
ccmmittee was constituted to work as an advisory body of DVAHAR and to
act as a liasion between the neighborhood and the DACHI group,
Shortly after the committee was formed, DVNAC began to play a strong
and dominating role in the committee. As a result of DVNAC's pervasive
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influence, the working committee made a recommendation to the residents'
association, DVHARA that the committee should have the mandate to make
decisions on DVHARA's behalf. The recommendation was rejected and the
committee resigned.
By May 1974, DACHI had no community groups to work with. Meeting
between DACHI and DVNAC to discuss names and structure of future working
committee proved useless. Ironically, the stalemate was resolved by
indirect communication when a resident became a courier between the two
interest groups. Finally, a seven-member working committee was formed.
It began to meet with the residents, the Cowley tenants, and the local
CMHC officials. Unlike the first working committee, the new one was
committed to the setting up of the co-operative. Citizen participation
began to work in Cabbagetown; more and more residents began to go to block
meetings. The Cowley tenants' group became involved with the various
aspects of the co-operative, such as tenant selection, management, and
administration.
Working Committee Input
By September 1974, the working committee presented its report to
DVHARA. The report had reservations about the architectural merits
of the DACHI proposal. It questioned the in-fill housing; criticized
the weakness of tenant organization and maintenance; and recommended
the community should sit on the DACHI board of directors.
By mid-September 1974, DACHI, responding to the need to involve
residents in the future management and administration of the co-operative,
changed the make-up of the board. Two Cabbagetown residents and two Cowley
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tenants were elected to the board to replace four incumbent directors.
Support and input from these residents were critical at this stage
because DACHI would turn the management and adminstration responsibilities
over to the community. Residents showed a growing interest in the project
and wanted to take part in future discussions. During the same period,
the architects were setting up slide shows of the co-op for the residents
and working with their suggestions.
The Cowley tenants' group formed an arbitration committee consistng
of four Cowley residents and one board member to hear complaints and
disputes among tenants and to make recommendations to the board about
evictions of those who breached the rules set up by the Cowley tenants
themselves. As rehabilitation began, other houses in the area were
made available for tenant relocation. Since the renovation process
was phased in different time span, the Cowley tenants would move out
when the work crew began working on their units.
10. REZONING APPLICATION
To build the 'in-fill' townhouses, DACHI filed a rezoning application
on June 1974. The city planning board had generally recommended DACHI's
plans. In his report, the Commissioner of Planning shared the aims
of DACHI:
In terms of the loss of a particularly vulnerable sector
of acconmodation, the DACHI project might be seen as an
attempt to counter the decline in the stock of lower
income housing in the area. [Report on Rezoning Application dated
July 31, 1974, from Dennis Barker, Commissioner of Planning, to
City Executive Committee. p. 3]
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Three variances from the by-law were required. First, to reduce
parking requirements from 100% to 50%; second, to waive certain setbacks;
and third, to get permission to develop "house behind a house". (Barker.
op. cit., p.4 .] In the application, DACHI would give existing Cowley ten-
ants first priority if they whished to live in the co-op.
The Housing Work Group--in charge of writing up the City's housing
policies--indicated their unanimous support and asserted that:
the DACHI proposal was unique in touching upon so many differ-
ent objectives of the City's housing policies, and that
given the considerable difficulties experienced by most non-
profit housing groups, the proposal represented one of the
few feasible development brought forward by the third sector
of the housing industry. [D. Barker. op.cit., pp.7-8]
Two members from the opposition property owners' association,
DVPOA, presented their briefs. They objected to the re-zoning applica-
tion for the following reasons:
(1) that there was no prior consultation with the local community,
and more than 1,000 signatures were submitted to the Executive
Committee and Council rejecting the proposal;
(2) that the DACHI proposal would reverse the favorable trend
occurring in Cabbagetown--"premises that were once over-
crowded flop houses are now pleasant one-family dwellings."
[DVPOA letter dated August 2, 1974 to Executive Committee]
(3) that the co-operative would become self-perpetuating and
could resort to block busting; and
(4) that the two aldermen supported the proposal because they
saw "the resurrection of Don Vale by the despised middle-class
[as] a depletion of their adherents and would seek to perpetuate
their own private empire." [DVPOA letter. ibid.]
Perhaps, another letter from DVPOA to the City Clerk concerning DACHI
clearly pinpointed their values. Two of their objections listed in it
included the following: (1) they were against any form of co-operative
housing "that does not finally result in homeownership or some form of
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equity for the participants; and (2) that the present housing crisis
represented "undertaking the impossible task of housing, at public expen-
ses, a large part of the indigent population of the world." In the letter,
it cited the example of Regent Park--the public housing to the south of
Cabbagetown--which housed only 1% native Torontonians. The letter added
that 60% of OHC (public housing built by the province) waiting list
applicants have only six months 'residence in Canada. [DVPOA letter dated
September 28, 1974 to City Clerk, City of Toronto.]
The general approach of DVNAC, the other opposition group, to the
re-zoning application was based on seemingly technical rationality. The
reasons for DVNAC's objections included:
(1) that DACHI could not really meet the housing needs of
Cabbagetown; and
(2) that the validity of the DACHI proposal under Section 15.1
of the NHA was questioned--that the Section 15.1 provided
funds only for renovation and rehabilitation purposes and
not for construction.
DVNAC, then, proposed a number of alternatives for. improvement, each of
which would defeat the DACHI proposal. It recommended two large houses
DACHI owned should be converted into senior citizens' housing by the
province. It called for homeownership under the AHOP program (see
Background), and it asked for a "historic area" designation for Cabbage-
town. [DVNAC letter dated August 7, 1974]
All these three recommendations would have stopped the DACHI
proposal, if implemented. First, taking away the two largest houses
would seriously affect the economic feasibility of the proposal; second,
the homeownership program (AHOP) was usually applicable to higher income
families than the Cowley tenants, and besides, CMHC stipulations prohibited
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freehold ownership housing; and third, the "historic area" designation
would impose stringent design control over the conservation of the existing
housing stock and would imply that the in-fill housing could not be built.
The objections of the two opposition groups were unsubstantiated. DACHI's
below market rate rents served the lower income groups. The NHA Section
15.1 did not forbid new construction. DACHI's aims to provide low income
housing in inner-city areas reflected the direction of the City's new hous-
ing policies.
In October, 1974, the City approved the re-zoning application. Later
in the week, with the opening of the first renovated house on Spruce
Street, DACHI seemed to have succeeded. However, in June, 1975, the
opposition appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB)--a three-member
quasi-judicial, autonomous body with the powers to overrule local zoning
ordinances--on three specific grounds. First, the in-fill housing was
substandard; second, the adverse impact of the nearby commercial street
on the project; and third, inadequate open space for the large number
of people, particularly children that the project would generate.
In February, 1976, OMB upheld the City's re-zoning approval and
asserted:
the proposal is not one that could be considered properly to
be the ideal for suburban living, but [the board] recognizes
the far reaching changes that are taking place in the City of
Toronto's planning concept based upon its desire to create
homes for needy and deserving persons ... Nor can great exception
be taken to the planning philosophy that seeks to rebuild
in conformity with building pattern of the past in seeking
to maintain stability in an older neighbourhood even though
some more modern planning philosophy is abridged to do so.
(Transcript of OMB Decision #R751216. February 18, 1976,
p. 22. Underlining by author. ]
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A few months later, the opposition group--the Don Vale Property
Owners Association (DVPOA)--filed a petition with the Committee of
Council at the Provincial level. "Through a polished lawyer and with
the help of the riding's MPP", the Cabinet issued an Order-in-Council
that prohibited DACHI to build the in-fill housing as planned. [ Interview
with a DACHI ex-president on January 30, 1980; an Order-in-Council
#O.C. 2224/76, dated August 3, 1976.] The Cabinet ruling was not based
on planning considerations nor legal technicalities, but rather
on political interests.
The MPP was instrumental in the whole process. By stopping DACHI's
in-fill housing, she symbolized the triumph of the Progressive Conserva-
tive party in protecting the interests of her political supporters. If
the in-fill was allowed, then two consequences would be produced that
were detrimental to her support in Cabbagetown. First, the in-fill hous-
ing would increase political opposition to her base in Cabbagetown; and
second, it would signify her unsuccessful intervention in the political
arena, thereby eroding much of her political influence and power.
The appeal of the OMB decision did not represent a win-or-lose situa-
tion. Rather it was perceived as a draw: DACHI was able to serve the low
income families but fewer of them; the opposition, though unable to exclude
the moderate and low income families from Cabbagetown, was successful
in getting the necessary political support from its elected representative.
The political forces were able to wield their influence when the issue,
trapped in the technicalities of the planning process, was brought home
to their own arena.
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CHAPTER THREE: DACHI-ANALYSIS
The study of DACHI has surfaced several issues critical to the understand-
ing of non-profit co-operative organization in inner-city neighborhoods
undergoing gentrification. This chapter analyzes the various aspects
of the case in terms of the central questions posed in the Introduction.
The thematic issues will be discussed in Chapter Six.
The DACHI case must be viewed as a countervailing force within the
framework of a gentrified neighborhood, the phenomenon of which is the
displacement of the working class renters. Within this setting the four
central questions will be addressed: (1) To what extent was DACHI able to
resolve some of the social concerns and the housing needs in Cabbagetown?
(2) Was DACHI as a community based non-profit co-operative housing organ-
ization conducive to the social integration of Cabbagetown? (3) To what
extent did the planning process framework in which DACHI operated allow
residents to control their environment or to achieve the goals of the
community? and finally (4) As a mechanism for providing affordable hous-
ing in Cabbagetown, how relevant is it to use non-profit co-operative
housing organizations as instruments to preserve existing neighborhoods
undergoing market reinvestments?
1
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RESOLUTION OF COMMUNITY CONCERNS & HOUSING NEEDS
The extent to which DACHI could or could not resolve these issues in
question depends on the following four aspects of the case. First,
the antecedent conditions such as population change, the history of urban
renewal, etc, were responsible for the lack of affordable housing and
the displacement of low-income renters. Second, the organization structure
of DACHI relates very much to the questions of affordability and the
vertical and horizontal equity of the housing project. Third, the
implementation process was significantly affected by the scale and the
nature of the proposal. Fourth, the resolution of these issues depends
on the perspective from which the analysis is based, in particular, whether
the substantive issues underlying the setting in Cabbagetown were approached,
corrected, or partially resolved.
Antecedent Conditions:
Before DACHI was formed, both the social concerns and the housing
needs were intertwined and embedded in the phenomenon of working class
displacement as a result of gentrification. Of great significance,
are the effects of urban renewal which set a series of antecedent conditions
into play, and thereby creating the social and housing problems in ques-
tion. The process of urban renewal, described in the case study, was
responsible for the following conditions. First, it split the community
into two distinct groups--the 'stability' and the 'pro-development'--which
subsequently gave rise to the class conflict between the working class
and the middle class. Second, the process itself radicalized the working
class renters. Finally, the removal of the urban renewal 'designation'
started a chain of market reinvestment leading to intensive speculation.
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Evidence from the case study also indicates both the decrease
of population and the composition of the ownership/rental mix changed
dramatically. The rate of in-migration of the renovators and the
displacement of the working class created the social/economic milieu
which had been catalytic for corrective measures. In this context,
DACHI was essentially reactive to what was happening in Cabbagetown.
The antecedent conditions gave rise to inflationary market reinvestment
and displacement of the working class. But they created also a poli-
ticized and a sympathetic constituency which gave DACHI its legitimacy.
Affordability, Equity, & organizational Efficiency:
If DACHI's goal was primarily to provide affordable housing, then
it could have been more easily realized in other parts of the city where
land was much less expensive. Inextricably, DACHI's goal to provide
housing in Cabbagetown indicated that its concerns were not just to
provide housing in the most economically nor the most efficient manner.
But rather the concerns were very much framed within the contexts of
displacement and the mechansims to check or rectify those concerns.
Thus, without considering this contextual framework, the analysis of
DACHI as a non-profit housing co-operative in terms of affordability,
efficiency, equity, etc. would have been misleading. The question, then,
critical to the analysis will be whether the housing goals DACHI set out
to accomplish were fulfilled, and if not, why.
First, the rent structure was more targetted for the moderate-income
than the low-income households. Several reasons contributed to the
problem of affordability: (a) the price of housing stock and land in
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the inner-city neighborhoods, and in particular, in Cabbagetown was
very expensive; (b) government grants were fixed at $5,000 per each
rehabilitation unit for urban areas--the limit was too low for inflated
prices. However, evidence from the case study also indicates that,
in comparison, with the market rent structure, DACHI offered substan-
tially lower rents for similar accommodation.
Second, if the rent structure contributed to vertical inequity, then
the policy of giving preference to the Cowley-house residents contributed
to horizontal inequity. Again, this issue must be balanced with the
question of possible relocation of the incumbent residents if DACHI was
to serve the needest. Moreover, the incumbent residents were a fixed
group of constituents DACHI could work with and share the responsibili-
ties of management and control in the later phase of community involvement.
Third, three factors contributed to the inefficiency of DACHI, as an
organizations (a) the lack of financial resource required co-operative
members to work on a voluntary basis; (b) the mortgage loan from the
government could not be drawn as salary for board of directors who were
permanent staff of the co-operative; and (c) the lack of development
expertise meant that members had to spend an inordinate amount of time
in structuring the financial package and designing the program. Moreover,
the time resource was required in citizen participatory process.
Implementation Problems:
The "in-fill" component of the program and the scale of the project
provided the basis on which the opposition built its objections, thereby
creating -a number of obstacles to the implementation of the proposal. Some
examples are cited below in support of this argument.
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The first example can be found in other non-profit housing corpora-
tions operating elsewhere in other parts of the city. These organizations
did not meet community opposition because they focused on renovation and
small scale projects, usually one to two houses in the community. Another
example will be the Spruce Court, located in Cabbagetown one street south
of DACHI, which was bought and renovated by the City's non-profit housing
corporation. The third example will be the Bain Avenue non-profit rental
housing in the community just east of the Don River-- a project based on
renovation and met no community resistance.
The implication is that if DACHI had pursued its orignal plan to
renovate the scattered houses in the community, it would have met little
or no resistance because there would have been no basis for the opposition
to fight against it.
Another Perspective:
If the resolution of the social concerns and housing needs is
approached in terms of the ideological construct of a non-profit
co-operative, the structure of DACHI seems to be able to resolve many of
the basic issues such as speculation, displacement, housing as credit
goodetc, that afflict our neighborhoods. Some of these issues are dealt
with later in the discussion. -Conceptually, DACHI was able to resolve
these issues because of the following reasons: First, DACHI as a non-
profit organization, implies that the rents were used to pay for the
government loans, and the maintenance of the housing units. No part of
the rents will be used for profits. Second, DACHI as a co-operative
integrates management, control and use without having its members to pay a
large down-payment to achieve that. Thus, it combines control over the
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environment with consumer sovereignty, thereby resolving the alienation
aspect that afflicts our housing problems. Third, DACHI resolves the dicho-
tomy between housing as shelter and use on the one hand and housing as
shelter and a commodity for speculative gains on the other. Finally,
because DACHI is a "par value" co-operative (as opposed to market value
or mortgage repayment types), the members can join without a large down-
payment and leave without cash subsidy from the co-operative. Thus,
it is anti-inflationary.
From this perspective, DACHI within its immediate physical environ-
ment resolves many of the basic issues underlying the housing problems
and community concerns of those found in Cabbagetown. Yet, the irony
is that DACHI was not successful in dealing with these issues outside
its immediate physical environment.
In summary, the analysis indicates the following findings:
o the antecedent conditions created the social concerns and the
housing shortage for the moderate and low income households
in Cabbagetown, but at the same time provided DACHI a strong
constituency made up of the politicized working class;
o because of the inflated land and housing value in a gentrified
neighborhood, the limitation of resources, and the lack
of expertise, DACHI could only provide for the moderate
rather than the low income households;
o the implementation process was adversely affected by the
'in-fill' and the scale of the proposal because of the political
opposition inherent in a gentrified neighborhood; and
o though DACHI could only resolve, to a limited extent, the can-
munity concerns and the housing needs in Cabbagetown, it was
able, to a large extent, to resolve them within its own environ-
ment.
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SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF CABBAGETOWN
The split in the community that was triggered by the urban renewal
was aggravated by DACHI. If the historic propensity of class conflict
in Cabbagetown, because of the precedent conditions discussed earlier,
had been dormant, DACHI was responsible for surfacing the conflict.
As will be argued in the discussion later, the split was articulated
in terms of ideology, in terms of class lines, and in terms of control
of these interests between property owners and renters. Though DACHI
re-activated these divisions within the community, it also re-integrated
them in the later stages of the developnent of the proposal.
Several reasons can explain this change. First, primarily because
the working class residents had been radicalized before and their parti-
cipation in the planning of DACHI was available, as the public meetings
indicated. Second, the working class residents were themselves potential
'victims' of the gentrification process, in the sense that in the work-
ings of the market forces, they were not rewarded but rather penalized.
Moreoever, their stay in the neighborhood was made precarious by the ram-
pant speculation and renovation of the middle class families. Thus,
if DACHI advocated the working class interests--the provision of affordable
housing--DACHI found an already sympathetic constituency. Third, as a
community-based organization, DACHI reinforced its legitimacy as proponents
of the working class interests.
As advocates, the DACHI members viewed the proposal as the embodiment
of particular interest groups. Planning, in this manner, becomes
pluralistic and partisan. As noted earlier, advocacy planning in Cabbage-
town identified with the low income renters rather than the homeowners,
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and thus became a class issue. Further, it identified with other partisan
politicians than the Progressive Conservatives, and thus became a political
issue, as Davidoff asserted "that there should be conservative and liberal
plans, plans to support the private market and plans to support greater
government control." [P.Davidoff. "Advocacy & Pluralism in Planning"
in JAIP XXXI No.5. 1965]
Though DACHI confronted the situation in terms of class and politi-
cal lines, it also created an opportunity for the opposition middle clas
and the opposition political party to take their stand. DACHI with its
established legitimacy was able to be very much identified with the
community residents' association, the aldermen, and the City's planning
agency.
Citizen participation process was the framework in which the social
re-integration of Cabbagetown found its roots. With citizen involvement
instituted, the split between homeowners and renters was gradually frac-
tionalized. The 'silent' moderates who were also property owners were
finally drawn into the DACHI camp because of the following three factors.
First, usually these moderates came to Cabbagetown because of their
dissatisfaction with the suburbs and Cabbagetown to them represented
the type of heterogeneous neighborhood they were looking for. Though
they bought and renovated their homes, their intention was not to speculate
or to sell them'when the price is right.' They were in Cabbagetown to stay.
In this manner, the moderates had a different ideological construct than
the conservatives' which was to keep out the low income renters in order
to protect their property interests.
Second, the open structure of the residents' association and the
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honest dealings of DACHI with the community, and their openness to allow
the public to participate in decision-making were instrumental in creat-
ing opportunities for the moderates to shift their support to these groups.
In addition, all decisions made about the DACHI proposal have had the
consensus of the majority of the community through public meetings.
Third, after DACHI received the guarantee of the government mort-
gage loan, it began to initiate community participation, such as block
meetings, sub-committees, etcetera. The re-structuring of DACHI board of
directors to allow future Cowley-house residents to become directors, and
the setting up of various sub-committees to reassess the proposal were
significant indications that DACHI was willing to relinguish its control
to the future residents of the co-operative and to the community.
In contrast, much of the strategies advocated by the opposition
groups had been formulated behind closed doors. Generally, their lobbying
techniques misrepresented the DACHI case, and the closed structure of
the property owners' association alienated the moderates. The
gradual shifting of the moderates' support to DACHI cause during the
process cemented the chasm that existed prior to DACHI--the chasm between
the working class and the moderates.
In summary, the analysis indicates the following points:
o DACHI aggravated the split between the working- and the middle-
class--a split that existed in the community before DACHI;
o the citizen participation process became the building block of
a more inclusive organizational community network;
o because of the fact that DACHI played the role of an advocate,
it also made sharper divisions along the political lines, i.e.
the non-Progressive Conservatives and the Progressive Conserva-
tives; and
o Cabbagetown became more socially integrated when the moderates
identified the co-operative as part of the community.
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PLANNING PROCESS FRAMEWORK
The analysis focuses on the politics of adoption: the decision-making
process, the support and non-support of DACHI, and the control and means
available for shaping the environment and achieving the stated goals.
The previous discussion identified the role of citizen participation as
instrumental to building a more inclusive network. This chapter analyzes
the participatory framework in terms of which interest groups worked
within it and which worked outside of it, and the reasons for these
different approaches.
The planning process framework based on public meetings, used in
Cabbagetown, was traditional and limited. It also polarized the various
interest groups. The opposition groups had attempted, within the con-
texts of the process, to advocate their positions. However, they did
that through the combination of the public meeting forum as well as
the political machinery. For example, the opposition groups wrote to
various politicians denouncing the DACHI proposal even before the
preliminary proposal was presented to the community. Later in the
process, after DACHI got the government loan, the opposition tried to
infiltrate the first working committee and demanded the mandate to make
its decisions.
Yet, the political machinery at the provincial level was very much
integrated with the planning framework and the decision-making processes
at the community, or even at the City level. For example, the reversal
of the favorable OMB decision by the Provincial Cabinet testified to the
supremacy of partisan politics. From this perspective, the decision-making
mechanisms available at the community and the city levels were subordinate
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to that at the provincial level. This strong division between the
province and the local governments is guaranteed by the Canadian
Constitution which gives the Provinces the mandate for housing policies
and the implementation of those policies within their respective jurisdic-
tions.
While the opposition groups worked within and outside of the
planning framework at the community level, the DACHI groups (DACHI,
the community residents' association, etc.) worked closely within the
established framework. There are three reasons for this differentia-
tion: First, the DACHI groups had the support of the community and
City; second, the established framework gave them the control over
their interests; and third; the goals of the community and the goals of
DACHI were quite similar, thereby giving DACHI both political and social
legitimacy in the community. The goals of DAGHI strengthened its legiti-
macy at the City level because they were synonymous with the City's (as
indicated by the Chief Planner during the re-zoning application process).
Furthermore, the ward aldermen, being advocates of non-profit housing,
politically supported the DACHI project.
Thus, within the established framework, the DACHI groups were able
to differentiate between the public and private interests--the public
referred to "providing affordable housing" and the private referred
to "keeping the neighborhood for the middle-class". And, of course, they
identified their interests with "the public interest". On the other hand,
the opposition groups, though refusing to equate "the public interest"
with those of the DACHI groups, generally felt the political and social
pressures within Cabbagetown and within the City Hall which indicated
their (the opposition's) interests were"private interests." One letter
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to the editor of a Toronto newspaper strongly indicated this general
sentiment:
What's wrong with being middle class? ...It took us three
years to save up enough money for a downpayment on a house...
But why must we be made to feel guilty for wanting our area,
with our friends' and children's friends across our streets?...
Why do we have to justify our desire and our need and our right
to live in a cohesive community where we will find people
like us--friends? (Toronto Star, January 25, 1974.]
Thus, there was a recognized public sentiment against renovators
and the middle-class in Cabbagetown, at least, to the extent that prompted
the writing of this letter. Curiously enough, the writer canvassed for
anti-DACHI support on the basis to "stop the high density, government
subsidized development", with hidden implications that DACHI was similar
to the generally despised "high-rise public housing." Though the division
between "the public interest" and "private interests" was not as clear
as in the case of say, urban renewal, the division was made clear enough
in Cabbagetown. But if DACHI -advocated "the public interest" within the
process framework, the opposition could only advocate their own interests
outside that framework. The political machinery at the provincial
level was the significant alternative.
Not only was the planning process limited for the opposition to
negotiate for their control, thereby forcing them to seek another
alternative, but also it was political. As discussed in the previous
chapter, DACHI as an advocate had to be partisan and its actions would
identify issues along class and political lines. DACHI and its supporters,
especially the aldermenidentified with other partisan political parties
than the Progressive Conservative Party, to which the local MPP and the
Mayor belonged. As noted earlier, the province and the city housing
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tasks force studies recommended non-profit co-operative housing as
alternate form of housing. Therefore, DACHI represented the implementation
process of these recomendations. Yet, the local MPP and the Mayor
being members of the Progressive Conservative, identified with the
anti-DACHI groups in Cabbagetown. This connection, then, raises the
issue of the dilemma--between the avowed "public interest" and their alleg-
iance to their political party, i.e. their "political interest".
Their resolution of this dilemma, as the case study indicates,
affected the DACHI proposal within the community process framework
and within the provincial political machinery at the Cabinet level.
In summary, the analysis indicates the following findings:
o public meeting forum as the planning process was limited,
uninformative and not instrumental in building consensus;
o the decision-making process within this framework worked for
the DACHI groups, and not for the opposition groups, to the
extent of getting control and achieving goals;
o the framework was useful for the DACHI groups because there
was a recognized conflict between the public interest and
private interests-, with the DACHI groups advocating the public
interest;
o the opposition groups worked outside of the community planning
and decision-making processes because within Cabbagetown and
in the City their interests were regarded as "private interests";
o once the opposition groups turned these "private interests"
into "political interests" for their local MPP, they gained
powerful support which eventually stopped the 'in-fill'; and
o because the final decision-making rests with the province,
the ability of the participants to gain control and to achieve
their goals, either at the community or city level, was very
much undermined.
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PRESERVING NEIGHBORHOODS UNDERGOING MARKET REINVESTMENTS
The analysis focuses on non-profit housing co-operatives as mechanisms
for preserving neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments. "Preserv-
ing" implies keeping or encouraging the moderate and the working class
families to stay in their neighborhoods without being displaced by a
"rising" market type such as the one in Cabbagetown. It does not imply,
however, preserving deteriorating neighborhoods.
As a means for providing affordable housing, non-profit co-operatives
such as DACHI, must be looked at as only one of the many strategies used
for stabilizing a "rising" neighborhood market type. Literature on
neighborhood stabilization suggests mechanisms such as increasing resident
ownership, moderating outside demand, constructing additional housing,
assisting residents to remain, etc. [see Goetz, Colton, et al. Stabiliz-
ing Neighborhoods: A Fresh Approach to Housing Dynamics and Perceptions.
Washington: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developnent. 1977]
The intention of this analysis is to see how relevant it is to
use non-profit co-operative housing like DACHI as prescriptive measures
to preserve neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments. This analysis
is done within the Canadian contexts, legislature, etc. as outlined in
the Background, and is carried out with particular reference in a gentrify-
ing neighborhood like Cabbagetown.
Some of the strategies for stabilizing a "rising" neighborhood
market, mentioned in the above, are in fact embedded in the idea of
a non-profit housing co-operative. Except for the strategy concerning
moderating market, DACHI comprises many of the other components: increasing
additional housing, ownership, and assisting residents to stay. In this
context, the DACHI case study, as well as the second case study are to a
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great extent a study of the implementation of these strategies. However,
what most literature did not indicate is the entrenched values, political
and economic interests--what I call the socio-political reactivism--
that became an almost insurmountable barrier to implementation.
Thus, DACHI is connected with two aspects of the same problem: the
implementation of strategies to preserve a gentrifying neighborhood; and
the soci-political reactivism that undermined the implementation process.
Related to the strategies in question, DACHI set up to provide
affordable housing and to increase residents ownership(collective), can
be viewed as a countervailing force within the framework of a gentrifying
neighborhood, and as an anti-market endeavor deleting the profit dimension
while giving the residents both control over their environment and manage-
ment of the housing.
As described earlier, a number of City sponsored non-profit rental
housing was provided for in Cabbagetown and in its immediate neighborhoods,
without meeting the socio-political reactivism as DACHI had. The primary
point that -can be made about these two types of organization is that
while the City 's corporation was more efficient in implementation, it
was less effective in building community consensus and leadership.
on the other hand, a cammunity based non-profit co-operative has a stronger
legitimacy within the neighborhood. While it was less efficient in imple-
mentation, it generally was more instrumental in developing local initia-
tive and leadership.
A small-scale project can be efficiently handled by private
co-operative organizations which have one or two people on the staff.
A renovation type of operation can avoid the kind of socio-political
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reactivism that DACHI encountered. many small-scale and renovation-type
of non-profit housing co-operatives have been providing housing for
the moderate and low-income families in Toronto without community opposition.
The thrust of the argument is not to show that non-profit housing
co-operatives have to be confined within the scale and type of developnent,
but rather to indicate that a community-initiated development has more
advantages than a City sponsored non-profit rental housing, and that to
overcome the socio-political reactivism the structure of the planning
process, the organizational set-up, the institutional framework, etc.
have to be changed. Some of these aspects will be further discussed in
the Conclusion.
As the case study and the previous analysis indicate, many of
these advantages include advocating consumer and community interests,
implementing a vehicle for local participation, mobilizing existing
community resources, meeting community needs, and providing an open
and more easily regulated developnent operation. A community-based
co-operative, especially in a gentrified neighborhood where there are
'affected' working class renters, has a constituency to work for.
The discussion pin-points the following reasons why a neighborhood-
based housing co-operative can play an important role in preserving
neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments:
o city non-profit rental housing has fewer problems of implemen-
tation, if based on rehabilitation type development, but it
initiates very limited community involvement;
o to avoid the socio-political reactivism, as shown in Cabbagetown,
non-profit co-operative housing can be either based on
small-scale, rehabilitation type of development or the
community based co-operative organization can be restructured
in terms of the participation process framework, the set-up
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of the organization itself, the institutional structureetc.;
o neighborhood based co-operative has a great many advantages
not readily available in a city-based organization: meeting
community needs; providing a responsive participatory process;
and building a more cohesive and integrated community.
o neighborhood based co-operative, in a gentrified neighborhood,
can easily find the 'affected' constituency to work with; and
o thus, neighborhood based co-operative can play a decisive role
in providing additional housing, increasing collective ownership,
assisting incumbent residents to stay, and creating a better
socially integrated community.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FRANKEL/LAMBERT - CASE STUDY II
1. INTRODUCTION
Located in the edge of a community about 2 miles north-west of downtown
Toronto, the Frankel/Lambert Neighborhood is a major residential
development being undertaken by the city non-profit housing corporation.
The project, consisting of some 750 units, a school, an elderly building,
community facilities, and parks, is now under construction. Even though
the community participated in the planning and development of the project,
it strongly opposed it.
The controversy surrounding Frankel/Lambert arose from the opposing
views and conflicts between the community and the City. In short,
the City's objectives are the cormunity's concerns. [ J. Berridge.
Interview January 21, 1980.] As much as the DACHI proposal had polarized
the interest groups within the community, the Frankel/Lambert proposal
had consolidated the community interests into one unified opposing camp.
The framework in which both the City and the community representatives
participated in the planning process not only constrained and frustrated
the ability of the community to implement its priorities but also
highlighted the major chasm between these groups in terms of their goals
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and values. The Frankel/Lambert case offers a number of insights
into the dilemmas the city non-profit housing corporation has to resolve,
and into the social milieu that underlines the contradictions in
"preserving existing community and in providing housing for the
moderate and low income families"-- the city non-profit housing
corporation's raison detre, which in itself a source of dilemma.
2. OVERVIEW
The 23-acre site for the Frankel/Lambert Neighborhood is part of a
community bordered by Christie Street, the Canadian Pacific Railway tracks,
Davenport Road, and Shaw Street. The community contains some 800 units,
of which 77% are owner-occupied. (Census 1976. General Population,
Housing, Family, and Labour Force. Data for Census Tracts] Some of
the houses were built in the 1920s but the majority was built after
the 1940s to accommodate the influx of immigrants from Europe and the
Mediterranean countries.
Between 1971 and 1976, the number of apartments had increased from
9% to 29%, while the detached houses decreased from 25%-to 20%.
[Census 1971 and 1976] To the north-east of Davenport Road and Christie
Street is a middle and upper-middle class neighborhood of Hillcrest
Park, which contains large single-detached houses and a strong community
and residents' association.
People
Immigrants who arrived in the early 1950s settled in this part of
the neighborhood, and by 1971 some 45% of the population were second
generation Canadian, mostly of Italian origin. The next major group
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was from the British Isles constituting some 23% of the population.
[ 1971 Census Tracts] But by the late 1970s, the community racial
mix was substantailly different. Though the Italian residents remained
the dominant group, other ethnic groups--the 'New Canadians' such as
the Greeks, the Portugese, and the Asians-- began to settle in the
neighborhood.
The population had decreased from 4,390 in 1971 to 3,300 in 1976
as the more wealthy residents began to leave the area for other parts
of Metropolitan Toronto for more spacious accommodation. The exodus
of the 'second generation' Canadians corresponded to the 'new communities'
west of the Metro. Those who remained during the same period were mostly
homeowners. Though homeownership showed an increase from 68% to 77%,
the actual number of units owned remained quite the same. In 1971,
615 units were owner-occupied, and in 1976 it was 620. Since the 1970s
the area has become a stable residential area in which homeownership
is generally high ( 77% as compared with the City's 42% in 1976).
In 1971, the average family income was $7,821, as compared with
$8,294 in Cabbagetown, $10,508 in the City, and $11,814 in the Metro.
[Income Distribution by Census Tract, 1971. Table 3] only 9% of those
who worked in 1971 earned above $10,000, as compared with the City's 38%.
The majority of the population consisted of blue collar workers engaged
in the production and manufacture industries, in particular, the building
construction trades.
Because of the absence of the impact of urban renewal in the
area (only 3 neighborhoods in Toronto had been designated for urban
renewal: Trefann Court, Cabbagetown, and Kensington), the community was
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not split on those issues in the way Cabbagetown was. The trickle
of the middle-class newcomers such as teachers, business executives,
and architects, who now live in the neighborhood has not created any
significant market investment pressures. The prices of the housing
stock had remained fairly constant. The price of a small semi-detached
2-storey house was around $41,000 in 1975, and it is now worth some
$50,000. ( Interview with D. Amato, a resident on Rains Avenue* January,
1980]
3. CITY NON-PROFIT HOUSING CORPORATION: GOALS & STRUCTURE
In 1972, the reformed-minded City Council and many neighborhoods
rejected government subsidized public housing that usually turned -into
ghettos for the poor. The city non-profit housing corporation was struc-
tured on -the philosophy and policy direction as espoused in Living Room -
a document written by the Housing Work Group ( 2 aldermen, and 1 representa-
tive from the Mayor's Office, City Planning Department, Development
Department, and City Legal Department) which recommended a number of
strategies for the City in providing alternative housing for the moderate
and low income households.
Among the recommendations, six are most pertinent to the goals and
structure of the city non-profit housing corporation.
o that the preservation and improvement of existing housing
and existing neighborhoods must be assisted by regulation,
and through financial and technical assistance;
o that the City should take an active role in housing and
explicitly the role of co-ordinator of all housing programs;
o that the development of the capacity of community based
non-profit corporations as producers of housing should be
encouraged to allow greater community involvement in the
planning and operation of housing projects;
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o that private non-profit producers of new housing be given
first priority in the allocation of site in the city land
bank; the City staff would give the private non-profit
groups technical assistance in project planning, design
construction, and operation;
o that at least 50% of all units produced should house families
with less than $7,000 income; and
o that the land assembly and banking program be instituted as
the entire thrust of the proposed short term strategy to
redistribute the benefits of public action, stabilize housing
prices and land cost component for limited income households,
provide suitable housing site, and ensure the development of
socially viable and better integrated communities and neigh-
borhoods.
Structure
City Council decided that the new city non-profit housing program,
under Section 15.1 of the National Housing Act, would be a major tool for
the implementation of these goals. Organizing for the delivery of housing
required the City to set up a housing department and a non-profit housing
corporation. In 1973, the city non-profit housing corporation was formed
under the Provincial Housing Development Amendment Act(1973) which allowed
Toronto to take advantage of the non-profit community sponsored housing
program.
The City Executive Committee comprising the Major and 4 senior
aldermen became the board of directors for the housing corporation.
The Commissioner of Housing became the corporation's general manager,
and the Commissioner of Finance its treasurer. The City set up a housing
department with a staff of 20 and with a budget of $250,000 in 1974.
In 1975, the City reorganized and expanded the housing staff to 50 to
serve 3 major functions. [J. Stutz. "The City of Toronto Housing Program"
in Housing and People. Ottawa: CCSD. Vol. 6., No. 2. Summer, 1975, p. 14]
80
First, the planning activities included acquisition of land for new
housing, acquisition of existing housing for rehabilitation, and planning
assisted housing projects. Second, the development function comprises
management of existing housing, new housing, property, and tenant relations.
Third, the administration function includes the responsibilities for
co-ordinating staff, developing procedures, and organizing accounts and
financial control.
The Commissioner of Housing reports to a standing Committee of
Council--the Committee on Neighborhoods, Housing, Fire.and Legislation
(NHFL). The non-profit housing corporation has no staff of its own and
the Housing Department becomes the resource for implementation.
[ Interview with City Non-profit Housing Corporation planners,
July, 1979]
4. THE FRANKEL/LAMBERT PROPOSAL
The 23-acre site consists a number of parcels: the Frankel Steel
Property (10 acres); the old Lambert Lodge property (9 acres); and
the Ontario Hydro Right-of-Way (3.5 acres). In 1975, Frankel Steel
decided to relocate and wanted to sell its property to the City. In
the same year, the Lambert Lodge property was severed into three parcels
owned respectively by the City, the Metropolitan Toronto, and the
Provincial levels of government. In approving the severances,
the Minister of Community and Social Services required certain assurances
from both Metro and the City as to the future uses of the land. These
assurances retricted Metro to the provision of "homes for the aged and
related social services purposes". The City is restricted to the provision
81
a the provision of either one or a combination of the following:
(1) public parks; (2) site for a school; (3) non-profit family housing;
and (4) community recreation and social facilities. [A.Littlewood:
Status Report Frankel/Lambert. 4 April, 1977. p. 4 ]
The existing community around the Frankel/Lambert site participated
in the planning of the new development in the Fall of 1976 when the City
was considering acquiring the Frankel Steel property. Two public
meetings were held to get community support for the acquisition before
the City Council made its decision. With the approval of the community,
the City paid $3.2 million for the property.
Existing Uses on the Site
The Lambert Lodge lands accommodated a wide range of uses. On the
City's portion of the property, there are 3 functions: St. Bruno's
Separate School--a temporary school in a series of portables; an office
building shared by Metro Social Services and by stores and laundry for
homes for the aged; and a park in the north-east corner. On Metro's
parcel, there are three buildings: the powerhouse and central maintenance
building; a Public Health District office with various clinics; and the
Ontario Geriatric Clinic and storage for Emergency Welfaze Services.
The geriatric clinic, involved in medical research and equipped by the
provincial government, is considered an important function because it
is located near the Castleview-Wychwood Towers--a 450-bed home for the
aged on Christic Street. On Provincial's land, several buildings house
the Ministry of Evironment Lab's, the School for Nursing Assistants of
the Ministry of Health, and a Ministry of Labour office.
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Planning Principles and Design Guidelines
The numerous uses on the Lambert lands and the tripartite ownership
of the site presented problems to the co-ordination of the development
of the entire area. A co-ordinated development of the site could occur
in two ways: First, the City could attempt to consolidate ownership of
the entire site; and second, the City could attempt to co-ordinate planning
of the entire area with the other levels of government.
The planning of Frankel/Lambert Neighborhood was based on five
principles:
o the new neighborhood would harmonize with the character
and the qualities of the old by using the traditional
Toronto grid for its layout, by providing a mixed income
community; [Littlewood: op. cit., p.9 ]
o the existing industrial and institutional buildings had no
potentital for residential renovation, and none of the buildings
on the site was worth saving; [City of Toronto. Frankel Lambert
Neighborhood. 1979. p.4]
o that the neighborhood should contain a variety of housing
types, design, and functions to avoid the 'project' feel
associated with government public development;
o the new housing would be arranged, as much as possible,
along new and existing local streets to provide for the activity
and street life associated with traditional Toronto streets; and
o sufficient public facilities such as parks and schools, will be
developed to support the new residentsand these new facilities
will be located in different locations for different recreational
and community activities.
The Frankel/Lambert site, since September 1978, has been divided
into development parcels each of which will have a separate developer.
Two documents, the zoning by-law and the plan of subdivision, define the
development standards and specify ownership of each parcel. The design of
individual parcels will be controlled by a set of detailed design
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standards and guidelines. Parcel developers will be required to submit
their designs to the City for formal review. The principles stated
earlier, would set the framework for major design direction.
Working Committee
Two public meetings were held before the City acquired the Frankel
Steel property. It was proposed in the second public meeting on 4 November,
1976 that a Working Committee be formed to assist in the planning of the
of the project, and to encourage area residents' input into the project
In early 1977, the Frankel/Lambert Working Committee (F/LWC) was formed.
It comprised 15 .voting members, 2 from each of the 6 streets around the
site and 1 from each of the 3 residents' associations in the community;
and non-voting members, the 2 ward aldermen, representatives from the
Housing Department, Planning Board, and other departments and government
agencies.
The terms of reference, discussed at the second public meeting,
were as follows:
o the working committee is to advise the Commisssioner of Housing
and the consultants for this project of the issues and concerns
related to the development;
o the issues would focus on the physical, social, and functional
compatibility of the project with the neighborhood, while taking
into account both the broader issue of housing as a citywide
concern, and the basis on which Council approved acquisition
of the site; and
o meetings will be open to non-committee area residents.
[Letter from the Commissioner of Housing to the City of Toronto
Executive Committee, dated November 4, 1976]
The process provided an important public forum for review and debate
over the development of the final plan. The Frankel/Lambert Working
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Committee met 25 times for the next 1 1/2 years, during which the develop-
ment of the final proposal evolved through a network of different processes
such as citizen involvement, complex negotiations with other government
agencies, and planning co-ordination of the entire site. It was not
until the summer of 1978 that the Working Committee was disbanded,
at which point the City was able to acquire the land from the other owners,
and to reach agreement with Ontario Hydro to lease its lands for park.
The New Neighborhood
The Frankel/Lambert Neighborhood is a mixed-income and mixed-use
development for families within a wide range of incomes and household sizes.
The project, when fully constructed in the early part of 1982, will contain
a total of 750 units. The breakdown of the unit mix indicates the
general range of accommodation being provided:
Family Non-family Senior Citizens' Total No.
Housing Housing Housing of units
Market ownership 140 - 140
Co-operative 130 60 190
Non-profit Rental 115 140 - 255
Senior Citizens - - 160 160
Total 385 200 160 745
Source: City of Toronto. Frankel/Lambert Neighborhood.
1979. p.8
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The City Non-profit Housing Corporation acted as a co-ordinator
in the planning process by negotiating the acquisitions, developing
the site plan, defining the program, and taking the project through the
numerous planning and funding approvals. In order to create a physically
and socially diverse community, the site had been sub-divided into differ-
ent parcels each of which would have its own developer. The housing types,
for example, the private market ownership housing, the government assisted
non-profit rental, and the co-operatives are mixed within the site (see
Development Blocks Plan of Sub-division).
The project is developed to serve households with income between
$15,000 to $20,000 per year. Both the co-operatives and the non-profit
rental units will have rent supplement families constituting some 25% of
all the units. The 140 homeownership units represent some 20% of the total
development, which is based on 0.9-1.0 times gross coverage.
5. PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
The conflicts between the Frankel/Lambert Working Committee and the City
emerged early and became more and more articulated as the plans progressed.
The goals of the City corporation are, to some extent, antithetical to
the interests of the neighborhood.
From September, 1976 to June, 1978, some twenty-five Frankel/Lambert
Working Committee meetings and several public meetings were held. During
this period, issues critical to the project centered on four main arguments.
o the density of the project was too high and incompatible
with the character of the surrounding neighborhoods;
o the homeownership component was too low in a community in which
80%-90% of the houses were owner-occupied;
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o the street pattern was unsatisfactory because it created
through traffic in local streets; and
o the parking provided in the project was inadequate, thereby
deteriorating the already bad parking conditions in local
streets.
The Frankel/Lambert Status Report can be viewed as a critical point
in the planning process, around which the principal arguments evolved.
Preliminary Frankel/Lambert Status Report
Four meetings preceeded the approval of the Status Report on
April 13, 1977. The City presented a proposal showing the new housing
units would be related to the existing street pattern so that the project
could be seen as "a part of the City and not as an isolated entity".
[F/LWC Meeting minutes dated March 8, 1977] The project was based on
a density of 1 times gross coverage so that affordable housing could be
produced. F/INC, in these four meetings, objected to the proposal for the
following reasons. First, the density was not justified because the
"land costs for the Provincial, Metro, and the Ontario Hydro lands were
unknown. "[F/LWC Meeting minutes dated April 4, 1977] It argued that
the existing 0.69 density of the adjoining neighborhoods should be consi-
dered. Second, F/LC questioned the possible negative environmental
impacts of the large-scale development on the ccmmunity. Third, it wanted
a school to be built within the development to accommodate the future
school children generated by the project. Fourth, F/DRC wanted a height
limitation on the development in order to reflect the surrounding scale.
Finally, F/NC was unsatisfied with the unit mix concerning rent supple-
ment, non-profit rental, and co-operative units.
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The Frankel/Lambert Status Report
The Status Report, basically a technical review of the site develop-
ment, did not respond to the arguments that had evolved so far. Rather
it focused on 4 aspects of the site development, 3 of which contained
numerous sources of coummunity concerns.
The community did not object to the first aspect which described
the tripartite ownership and the need for co-ordinated development.
The second aspect dealt with the objectives and principles. It described
the aims of the project, which were to provide low and moderate income
housing, to achieve successful physical and social character of existing
Toronto neighborhoods, and to link the new with the existing neighborhoods
by a system of roads. Though F/LWC endorsed the objectives and principles,
it strongly opposed the methods used to implement them--methods such as
extending local streets to the new development.
The third aspect defined the program for the development. It dealt
with housing, school, community and recreational facilities, and parking.
The first and the last components had been objected to by F/LWC. The
housing program called for 65%-75% non-profit rental and co-operative
housing; the rest for homeownership. It suggested 25% to 50% rent
supplement in both the rental and co-operative units, and a gross
density of 1 times coverage. For the parking requirements, it suggested
reduced requirements for family and non-family rental units ( 1 space/
2 family rental, and 1 space/3 non-family rental).
The fourth aspect dealt with street patterns and built form.
The built form was an architectural analysis of block sizes containing
different housing types such as row, semi-detached, apartment buildings.
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F/LWC objected to the assumption of the 1 times coverage used for the
exercise. The Report suggested 3 'generic street patterns' to connect
the new development to the adjoining neighborhood to which F/LWC
had also strongly objected. The Report, however, opposed cul-de-sacs
because "they are dangerous, as a result of backing and turning...
and they erode the publicness and liveliness of a street life and
make the street an exclusive space rather than a public space".
[Littlewood: op. cit., p.20] In essence, what it wanted was to extend
Melita Street which was a cul-de-sac, and the adjoining streets to the
new development.
On April 13, 1977, four members of F/LWC represented the community
at the NHFL Committee meeting. Two F/LWC members questioned some of the
assumptions and principles in the Report, but endorsed the recommendations.
The points which these two F/LWC members raised at the meeting included
a 38-foot height limit, a residential coverage of 0.7 density, 18-foot
lot widths, higher homeownership component.
Two other F/LWC members supported the principles as outlined in the
Status Report. They were against any height limit in order to leave
site planning options open. They supported the 1 times coverage because
of the economic constraints on the site, and were in favor of the unit
mix and rent supplement component in the new development.
6. PLANNING PROCESS & INTEREST GROUPS
Though F/LWC became the only forum for the process of negotiations and
interaction between the interest groups, it simultaneously generated
constraints on. the community representatives' ability in making changes.
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PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS
Three primary factors undermined the process of negotiations.
First, F/LWC members had to negotiate with the City representatives
who had not the final decision-making powers. Second, this situation
was aggravated by the fact that the City itself did not have the ownersip
of the entire site, and hence, its lack of planning and administrative
control over the development. Third, the complexity of the program
involving the provision of school, senior citizen's home, etc., required
the approval of a multitude of government agencies at different levels
of government.
In these circumstances, the interest groups negotiated and
engaged in trade-offs which were not binding because decisions made at
the time could only be tentative decisions dependent on factors external
to both the City and F/LWC. For example, the provision of a school would
fall within the jurisdiction of the Toronto School Board, the Metropolitan
Toronto Separate School Board, and the Provincial Ministry of Education.
Another example, the provision of community and day-care facilities
as suggested by F/LWC members, in a Metro senior citizens' building would
run contrary to the Metro's normal program for such a project.
Moreover, the mechanism provided in the process did not allow
constructive dialogue. Disagreement or objections were not resolved at the
meetings between interest groups, but rather they had to be referred back
to the appropriate level -in the government agencies where final decisions
could be made. For example, the members of F/LWC would have the burden
of presenting their objections to the Executive Committee or the NHFL
Committee.
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In retrospect, one of the F/LWC members severely criticized
the whole process of negotiations and community participation:
the meetings were cooked, the end result were predetermined,
and the community had been used as a tool...in general, I
don't understand why the City asks the neighborhood questions
when it is unwilling to change from its course of actions
on the basis of advice received from the Working Committee.
[Interview with a F/LWC member who wished not to be named,
January 15, 1980]
Thus, the complexity of the development, the lack of control of
the site, and the involvement of numerous government agencies generated
a process in which various interest groups competed and bargained with each
other for control over jurisdiction, programming, and decision-making.
INTEREST GROUPS
The interest groups can be categorized into two camps: the
voting members of F/LWC; and the non-voting members of F/LWC. As described
before, the former consisted of cammunity representatives from the
neighborhoods in the area. The latter included representatives from
the Housing Department, Planning Board, School Boards, and other levels
of government agencies. The ward aldermen and the riding's Provincial
Member of Parliament were also part of this group. The number of 15
voting members was fixed; but the non-voting members participated in
the meetings only when issues concerning their agencies were discussed.
The discussion that follows will first focus on the nuances of
interests among F/LWC voting members, and second on the other interest
groups among the non-voting members.
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Interest Groups: Voting Members
The community, as described earlier, has a majority of its residents
from the blue-collar class, but those elected to F/LWC come from the
middle-class. The F/LWC voting members represented a wide range of
professions: university professor, architect, business executive,
teachers etc. The upper-middle class voting members were from the
Hillcrest and Wychwood neighborhoods, north-east of the site. Of the
adjoining 7 streets, Rains, Hector, and Marchmount would be most affected.
The interests of representatives from these streets are different from
those of the Hillcrest/Wychwood area.
Three distinct groups can be identified. First, as evidenced
by the F/LWC members' reactions to the Status Report, there were two
members who were sympathetic with the City's proposal. To this minority
group, the technical issue were secondary to the primary aim of the
City to provide affordable housing for the moderate and low income
households. From this perspective, the density, the homeownership mix,
and parking requirements were insignificant.
One dissenting member was the vice-chairman of F/LWC, representing
Marchmount Road, and the other one was representing Shaw Street.
This minority group of two had not been able to influence other members.
Because of this, dissension with F/LWC was not significant enough to
divide the members into different camps, and the values and opinions
represented by F/LWCin general, represented those of the majority group.
The second interest group constituted the majority. As will be
discussed later, the objections of this group turned from the technical
issues to the more fundamental issues such as the City's mandate to
provide housing, or the "expensive" price the City paid for the Frankel
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Steel property which consequently required the high density to make
the project economically possible. This group represented the more
'conservative' values of the community. Among the group, the more
articulate members who strongly opposed the City's proposal were the
Chairman of F/LWC from Hector Avenue, and the representative from the
Hillcrest Park neighborhood.
The third group comprised those members living on the adjoining
streets especially on Rains, Hector, and Marchmount. These members
strongly resisted the City's "generic" street patterns tying the old
and the new neighborhoods by extending local streets. In essence,
this group wanted to keep the neighborhood from becoming a part of the
new developnent for two main reasons: negative impact on the existing
house and land value, especially if the proposal was perceived as
"public housing" by the general public; and the deterioration of their
streets in terms of "through traffic" and parking conditions.
Thus, their objections to the new development were based on (1)
the street pattern which became a critical issue between the members of
this group and the City's Consultant; (2) reduced parking requirements
for the family and non-family rental units which they saw would generate
excess parking on their streets; and (3) the density of the development
in terms of the 'incampatible" scale between the old and new neighborhoods--
a factor which would lower their property value.
In general, all these 3 groups were motivated by two concerns:
(1) the value system they held in terms of their views and ideas about
provision of moderate and low income housing in their neighborhood. Within
this ideological construct, the first and the second interest groups belonged.
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The first minority interest group shared this ideology and under-
stood the density, homeownership and rental mix, etcetera, were necessary
constraints if housing produced was to be targetted for the moderate and
low income families. The second interest group with members from the
Wychwood neighborhood whose property would hardly be affected, ideologi-
cally objected to the City's proposal by questioning the City's mandate
to provide housing.
(2) the economic and physical impact on the existing property value
constituted the second construct to which the third interest group be-
longed. Yet within this third interest group, there were members living
on Melita Avenue (directly facing the existing industrial plant and the
government institutions) who favored the new development in terms of its
positive environmental change in the area and in terms of creating a more
compatible land use (residential) than what was on the site (industrial
and institutional). The Melita Avenue residents saw the project as a
definite environmental and visual improvement. However, they were a minor-
ity within this third interest group. Residents on Rains, Hector, and
Marchmount represented the majority of the third group whose views were
described earlier.
Interest Groups: Non-voting Members
In this category, six interest groups are identified: (1) the City;
(2) the elected representatives; (3) the School Boards; (4) Metro Social
Services; (5) Ontario Hydro; and (6) Provincial Ministry of Labor.
Most of these interest groups would be discussed in the following
two sections. This section focuses on two perspectives: (A) the
balance between community interests and those of the City and the elected
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representatives; and (B)the commitment or non-commitment of the other
groups in co-ordinated site planning. This division is made because of
two primary reasons. First, Metro, Ontario Hydro, and the Provincial
Ministry, being different government agencies, did not have to commit
themselves either in support or non-support of the City's project, or
its mandate to provide affordable housing. Second, these agencies were
also co-owners of Lambert site, and hence, a more cogent examination will
be to understand those factors influencing their commitment or non-
commitment in co-ordinated site planning.
(A) Balance of Interests: The first interst group--the City was
engaged in three different but interrelated processes. First, the.City
was involved with the physical development of affordable housing in
Frankel/Lambert site. Second, the process of citizen participation was
a tool to get community support rather than community control over the
development. The third process concerned with site planning co-ordination
with other agencies was a necessity because of the lack of control over
the ownership of the site.
Among these processes, the second and the third.were secondary to
and in support of the City's mandate to provide affordable housing.
Problems arising out of site co-ordination with other agencies could be
resolved by consolidating the site ownership which eventually the City did.
But conflicts of interests between the City and the community could not
be resolved without jeopardizing the City's housing objectives--not only
to build a moderate and low income housing development but also a develop-
ment that would harmonize with the existing neighborhood. The balance be-
tween community interests and the City's priorities was struck: the density
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and the proposed unit mix in order to create an economically viable
affordable housing; and in terms of the proposed street pattern in order
to physcially integrate the new with the old neighborhoods, or at least
not to creat a 'project f eel' about the new development.
The second interest group--the local Provincial Member of Parliament
and the two ward aldermen supported the new development, or at least the
two aldermen were bound by "their office to support the City housing
policies". [F/LWC Meeting minutes dated September 14, 1977] However,
their political interests required them to support their constituency
wherever possible. From this perspective, the elected representatives
looked at the project in terms of which components in the development
were critical to the project's economic viability and which were not.
Section #7 will further explore this particular aspect.
(B)Commitment or Non-Commitment in Co-ordinated Planning: The third
interest group--the School Boards co-ordinated with the overall planning,
in particular the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School. Five reasons
can account for this commitment: (1) the Separate School Board's
temporary but over-enrolled St. Bruno's Separate School situated on
Lambert land had been serving the predominantly Catholic families in
the community; (2) there was a strong community support for the Separate
School System in the area where student enrollment had been increasing;
(3) the existing unmet demand and the anticipated demand consequent of
the new development created a real and urgent need for a Separate school;
(4) a new school building could only accommodate the new recreational and
cultural facilities, such as the gymnasium and the library, which the
community wanted to share; and (5) a bigger and a fully equipped new school
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was definitely preferrable to the existing temporary portables. Thus,
the Separate School Board's interests corresponded to the community's,
and the Board's commitment in co-ordinated planning also reflected
and met the objectives set by the community.
The rest of the interest groups--Metro Social Services, Ontario
Hydro, and the Provincial Ministry of Labor had many reasons for non-
commitment in co-ordinated site planning with the City. Among these
reasons, three were most evident. First, these agencies had ownership
of the land, and thus, control of the uses of their property. Second,
co-ordinated planning implied diminishing their control. Finally,
accommodating the City's or/and the community's interests would create
unnecessary (in the sense that their commitment was voluntary) conflicts
between the agencies own priority and those of the City and the community.
The following section will examine these conflicts in greater detail.
7. COMMUNITY ISSUES & STRATEGIES
Although the majority of the Frankel/Lambert Working Committee members
opposed the project for different reasons, as described earlier, the
Committee, as a whole, worked collectively to identify the issues
and to adopt strategies that would bring about political support.
The strategies comprised a series of actions intended to manoeuvre
interest groups to a position sympathetic to the concerns of F/LWC.
These strategies included the following: (1) identifying community
issues related to Frankel/Lambert development; (2) requesting the elected
representatives to state and clarify their positions on those issues;
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(3) creating a situation in which the Housing Commissioner had to respond
to those issues; and (4) using the Commissioner's response as a f6cus for
the interest groups to clarify their positions.
This chain of actions occurred in the period from July 19,1977 to
September 14, 1977, coinciding with the development of the site plan.
The following account traces those strategies F/LWC employed and
describes the outcome of the manoeuvres.
Identifying Community Issues
The 'Site Planning Progress Report' completed on July 12, 1977
acted as a catalyst for the F/IWC members to document the community
issues in a Brief which they presented to the City Executive Committee
on July 20, 1977. Prior to the presentation of the Brief, F/LWC had
discussed various aspects of the site plan on two previous meetings.
Two specific items in the site plan recommended by F/LWC had not
been implemented. First, F/LWC recommended a dispersed form of low-rise
senior citizens' housing that would contain community and cultural
facilities. The Metro Social Services Department, in charge of Metro
senior citizens' housing, and its consultant presented a study which
called for a 250-unit high-rise senior housing. The F/LWC members
rejected this proposal on the grounds that "it was written without
any communication between F/LWC and the Consultant and it did not
reflect the objectives of the City and the community." [F/LWC Meeting
minutes dated June 22, 1977. p.1]
Second, the City's consultant presented the preliminary site plan
report which suggested 4 alternative street patterns. The one recommended
by the consultant was strenuously objected by some F/WC members.
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In the Brief presented to the City Executive Committee, F/LWC
documented 'major', 'medium', and 'minor' issues related to the development.
Four 'major' issues identified were (1) Density: F/LWC objected to the
proposed density of 1 times gross coverage as incompatible with the
existing low density community, and quoting from the Robarts Background
Report, a housing study of Metro Toronto, it stated:
the acceptability to local neighborhoods of new housing projects
depends to a great extent on the ability of elected represent-
atives and local officials to ensure that development proposals
fit in well with the existing community. (F/LWC Brief to
the City of Toronto Executive Committee. July 19,1977, p.1]
(2) The Program: In particular reference to the rental housing
component of the project, F/LWC identified the new development as
'public housing', and asserted that:
public housing projects are seen as particularly burdensome
since they generally require municipal cost sharing and may,
in addition, bring social and other problems. [ibid., p.2]
F/UiC presented statistics from the Robarts Report that showed that
Toronto had built more public housing (1952-1974) than any other boroughs,
and questioned why the City wanted to build more.
(3) Road Pattern: Because of the proposed extension of Melita
Avenue to Shaw Avenue and Christie Street. The community and all members
of F/LWC found the road pattern unacceptable. Zt was strongly felt
that Melita Avenue should stay as a cul-de-sac to ensure no vehicular impact
on Rains and Hector Avenues.
(4) Parking: F/LWC found the reduced parking requirements for
the rental housing units inadequate. It asked the City to furnish all
the necessary information on the number of parking spaces, and parking
arrangements in the development such as off-street or indoor parking.
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F/LWC identified six 'medium' issues all of which required
the City's clarification of status of the program facilities envisaged.
These issues included the following: (1) School Provision: F/LWC found
there was inadequate information on the proposed school site, parking
spaces, and student enrolment; (2) Ontario Hydro Right-Of-Way: The
City and F/LWC had suggested the use of the right-of-way for park and
road development, but Ontario Hydro was recently considering a plan to
use its land for storage purposes. F/LWC asked the City to pursue
this matter further with Ontario Hydro; (3) Metro Senior Citizens'
Units: After F/LWC's suggestion of a dispersed form of senior housing
was turned down by the Metro government agency, F/LWC asked the agency
to consider a single loaded corridor type structure. The Commissioner
of Metro Social Services recently informed F/LWC that the proposed struc-
ture would too expensive to get Federal funding approval; (4) Local
Senior Citizens: F/LWC wanted special consideration be given to the local
senior citizens in applying for the housing units. Yet the City and the
Metro Social Services had not began to dicuss this aspect. F/LWC
asserted that "this should be a consideration if we are considering the
existing community and its needs"; [ibid., p.3 ] (5) Notification
of Rezoning Application: F/LWC wanted the notification to "list all
proposed Non-profit Housing planned for the Ward, their location and
density coverage...This will enable each group and citizens to understand
and analyze the impact of 1.0 gross densityon their neighborhoods, i.e.
communicate the current policy of the City of Toronto Housing Department";
(ibid.] and (6) Height: The proposed site plan showed 2 apartment
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structures that might be 5-6 stories high. F/LWC felt that they were
too high to be properly integrated with the existing area.
In the Brief, F/LWC identified 2 'minor' issues: (1) Report Graphics:
F/LWC found them misleading and lacking in data and dimensions; and
(2) Report Schedule: F/LWC objected the schedules for submission to
various Committees and wanted to have more time to review the various
reports and "enable working taxpayers adequate time to review and prepare
reports". [ibid., p. 4 ]
In conclusion, the Brief stated that F/LWC did not wish to delay
the program by a flat rejection of the report, but instead, " we request
that the rezoing application proceed and that the Housing Department
be instructed by Council to alter the program to more homeownership which
permits reduced density and meets the community 's concern."
Request for Issues Resolution
The City Executive Committee referred the F/LWC Brief to the
Commissioner of Housing for considerations and comment. Although F/LWC
continued to press for a change in unit mix, tenure mix, and the density,
the Housing Department co-ordinator explained that "he was not prepared
to make a recommendation radically changing the existing program. "
[F/LWC Meeting minutes, August 10,1977 p.4] On August 12, 1977 the
preliminary site plan was approved by Council.
On September 2, 1977 in a letter to the Commssioner of Housing,
F/LWC felt that "there is an urgent need for you to get involved
personally" to take the necessary action to resolve or recognize the
issues. It further stated that 'we cannot as a Committee continue to agree
to diagree and be motivated to participate in further planning sessions."
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The members of F/LWC wanted to know where the Commissioner and
the elected representatives stand on the issues as stated in the F/LWC
Brief. F/LWC also requested them to document their position and provide
handouts for distribution because " we, the Committee, have documented
our concerns on behalf of our community and we see no reason for our elected
and paid representatives not to be able to do the same!" [ibid., p.2 ]
The Committee "invited" the Commissioner of Housing, the ward Aldermen
to a meeting scheduled on September 4, 1977.
Response of the Commissioner of Housing September 9, 1977
The Commissioner's response and position were, to a large extent,
a restatement of the positions that had been presented at F/LWC meetings
by either/both the City's representatives and Consultants. In his letter,
he clarified his position on each of the issues F/IWC raised.
(1)Density: The Commissioner justified the proposed density for the
following five reasons. First, the original density (1.35 times coverage)
at the time of acquisition had been reduced to 1.0 times coverage.
Second, the proposed density was the minimum to make the project
economically viable. Third, the density did not appear "unreasonable"
in terms of the physical and social implications--senior citizens' building,
3-storey townhouses. Fourth, in terms of the impact of this project(at
the proposed density), the neighborhood would have a new school and
playground, recreational facilities and parks. Fifth, the replacement
of industrial and institutional building with residential uses provided
a reasonable compatibility between the new and the old neighborhoods.
(2) The Program: The Commissioner argued that the different mix of
ownership, and co-operative and non-profit rental housing was reasonable
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because of the City's mandate to provide affordable housing--the homeowner-
ship component was added to the project to reflect the character of the
existing community; and because there was the Federal program (AHOP)
which offered homes at reasonable costs to the buyers. Furthermore,
he argued that the City did not want to increase the homeownership
component because to do so would mean a decrease of family rental and
co-operative units.
(3) Road Pattern: In essence, the City's position was similar to
the Consultant's, namely, Melita Avenue should continue across the site
because it would link the two communities both "physically" and
"symbolically", and perpetuate the normal City street pattern.
(4) Parking: The Public Works Department had accepted the reduced
requirements of the rental housing. Marchmount Road which had bad park-
ing conditions would be provided with a new lane for access to backyard
parking.
The Commissioner clarified the following 'medium' issues:
First, the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board indicated their
interest in building a school in the community. Second, the Metro Social
Services had received the site plan and found it acceptable in terms of
area and location for a Metro senior citizens' 6 -7 storeys structure.
Third, the local senior citizens living in the surrounding area would
be given priority for accommodation on the site, and the local residence
preference had been the normal procedure for the City in selecting tenants
for its housing.
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Positions of Interest Groups
The Housing Commissioner's letter was tabled and used as the focus
for discussion in the F/LWC meeting on September 14, 1977. Eleven F/NC
members, the two ward aldermen, and the local Provincial Member of Parlia-
ment presented their positions on the issues. The views and comments pre-
sented in the meeting indicated a consensus among the F/LWC members. In
the past, F/IWC members had generally questioned the 'technical' issues,
but in the meeting the majority of the members questioned the more
'basic' concerns such as the ineffectiveness of the Working Committee,
the City's mandate to provide housing, and so on.
In essence, the F/LWC members adopted a new basis for their position.
On the question of density, some members wanted an all market ownership
housing development. Some challenged the City's contention that increas-
ing the homeownership would not decrease the density and they wanted the
City to produce an economic analysis in supporting that contention.
On the question of the street pattern, a survey conducted by one
member indicated that:
In general the residents feel that the City will go ahead
and do whatever it wants anyway and we will be put in a position
where the only way we can avoid being part of the new develop-
is sell our houses.- [F/LWC Meeting minutes. September 14, 1977]
Several members also questioned why it was important to join the streets
because "most people in the area relate to other people on the street in
which they live and not to people on other streets." (ibid., p.11]
Several members asked why the City wanted to build non-profit
rental housing in the city areas where the price of land was expensive
and not in the suburbs where the land would be much cheaper. A few members
felt the Working Committee had reached an impasse because expediency was
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emphasized rather than long-range plans, because of the lack of compati-
bility of the project as a result of a large scale development in a small
residential low density neighborhood, and because of the $300,000 per
acre price for the Frankel Steel property, which constrained the density
and the economic feasibility of the development.
A number of F/lWC members shared this position and one felt that
"no concessions had been made by the Housing Department and that the dia-
logue of this meeting was unlikely to change that." [ ibid., p.2] Another
questioned why the City wanted to plan with the neighborhood when the City
was unwilling to adopt different alternatives suggested by the working
committee. (ibid., p. 8]
The elected representatives--the MPP and the two aldermen--were able
to distinguish between those issues critical to the project and those
not critical. For example, all three of them supported the density pro-
posed by the City, but expressed doubts about the street pattern. The
MPP though Melita extension was "a political question and not necessarily
a site planning issue", and, therefore, he supported the community.
[ibid., p.4] They all confirmed the Frankel Steel price was very reason-
able, thereby implying that the capital cost of acquisition did not create
both the density and economic constraints. They strongly supported the
non-profit rental housing and defended the Working Committee process.
Thus, all of the elected representatives were in support of the City
proposal, either because of the political platform they advocated as
in the case of the MPP or because of their responsibilities as City Coun-
cil representatives for carrying out the City's mandate as in the case
of the two aldermen.
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Outcome
The process and the strategies initiated by F/LWC leading to clari-
fication of the position of different interest groups had been unresponsive,
considering that F/LWC Brief was submitted to the City Executive Committee
on July 20, 1977, and it was not until one and a half months' later that
the Housing Commissioner responded.. The Commissioner's letter either con-
firmed or defended the City's positions. Both the nature of the issues
and the process by which F/LWC and the City negotiated their terms limited
the outcomes. The City's policies of affordable housing resulted in a
density and unit mix to which the community objected; and the City's plan-
ning principles such as'integrating the old and new neighborhoods' created
a street pattern which the community regarded as 'otherhood statements".
Especially when such integration was merely considered in the physical
aspects of development while ignoring the community social and economic
characteristics.
Prior to the outcomes, the community had hoped that much more respon-
sive support would come from its elected representatives because the
'reform' City Council, elected by a popular vote, had promised to gives
local neighborhoods more rights to plan their own environment through a
participatory process. Not that the elected representatives had abrogated
this promise, but that they were caught in a dilemma created as a result
of the City's housing policies. The dilemma, apparent in the process,
was between neighborhood's interests and, thus, the elected representatives'
political interests on the one hand, and the City's mandate and, thus,
the elected representatives' political obligation on the other.
For example, the local MPP was elected on the New Democratic Party's
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platform. Among its promises, one was to provide affordable housing,
especially co-operatives for the moderate and low income families.
Also one of the aldermen had been an advocate for land and home banking
policies as an integral municipal intervention in the housing market.
Following the September 14, 1977 F/LWC meeting, several responses
occurred. First, the Public Works Department reported that the traffic
generated by the project would be between 50 and 150 cars in the morning
peak hour and the impact on the existing streets should not be excessive.
Second, the Housing Department found that an increase in homeownership
units would result'in a marginal reduction in the overall site density.
Third, on September 29, 1977, some 60 residents attended a public meeting.
The results of the public meeting indicated unanimous objection to the
site plan, re-affirmed F/DNC position on those issues discussed before,
and demonstrated both the impatience and threats of the community:
We, as taxpayers and citizens, are being asked to judge a
proposal that will impact the value and quality of our
neighborhood, our properties, and our way of life. Some
of us are prepared to ensure that we are heard now or at
OMB or at Cabinet level. [F/LWC Public Meeting. Septem-
ber 29, 1977.]
Thus, the strategies initiated by F/LWC in July 1977 had produced
by September, 1977 a strong community support for F/LWC. The split
that occurred now was no longer between the Housing Department and F/LWC,
but rather between the Housing Department and the elected representatives
on the one hand and on the other the community and F/LWC.
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8. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY & SITE CONSOLIDATION
The development strategy of Frankel/Lambert did not emerge in the planning
process until October, 1977 when the City published the Site Plan Report.
Although the tripartite ownership of the site made the implementation
process much more difficult, site consolidation was not finalized until
February, 1978.
Both aspects were interrelated. They not only affected the program-
ming of the whole development (which agencies dealing with what facilities),
they also influenced the indecisiveness of the City in the negotiation
process. For example, the price the City had to pay to acquire the
entire site had economic implications on the program. More important
was that other levels of government (Metropolitan, Provincial agencies)
wavered between land exchange or an outright sale. This aspect will be
further discussed later.
Thus, the lack of site ownership until the final stage of Frankel/
Lambert development contributed to the problems of implementation. For
this reason as well the development had been described in terms of 825
units to 1,000 units, and the program changed from time to time.
Development Strategy
The strategy was based on dividing the site into development parcels.
The non-profit co-operative blocks would be leased to private co-operative
groups each having its own design and developer. Those blocks for govern-
ment assisted housing (AHOP) and market ownership units would be subject
to a proposal call, involving the private development industry.
In the proposal call process, the City would define its program and
its social and physical objectives and would seek proposals from the private
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development sector. The overall proportions of rental and ownership
housing and the distribution of units of different sizes would be defined.
The specific pattern of units would be negotiated between the City and
the successful bidder during the proposal call phase. The successful
bidder would build the City's non-profit rental units which the City
would maintain, the government assisted AHOP units, and other market
private ownership housing.
The design proposal of any successful bidder would be expected to
follow the guidelines of a site planning design handbook that
would be jointly prepared by both the Planning and Housing Departments.
Sale of Land: The AHOP and the market ownership lots would be sold
to the developer as 'freehold' not subject to any resale price control,
for five main reasons. First, resale price controls would discourage
potential purchasers. Second, the relative simplicity of built form and
parking arrangements would enable homeownership lots to be sold freehold.
Third, leasehold and resale price control arrangements, aimed at restrict-
ing the possibility of assembly and redevelopment, would be less likely in
newly constructed neighborhoods than in existing 'older' low density
neighborhoods. Fourth, new AHOP homes would have a maximum first sale
price of $47,000 as compared with the $45,000-$50,000 house prices in
the surrounding area. Thus, the reseale price control for the purpose
of eliminating speculative profit taking would not be necessary. Fifth,
speculative profits would not occur on the other forms of ownership units
since their low prices would be determined by canpetitive bidding.
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Site Consolidation
The Metro, Ontario Hydro, and the Provincial agencies will be
considered in terms of their ownership of the Lambert land.
The Metro government owned a 4-acre parcel which, under the sever-
ance provisions,- was restricted to building elderly housing or "senior
citizens' facility." Metro generally supported the proposal of senior
citizens' housing on the site. The Metro Commissioner of Social Services,
responsible for Metro Senior housing, had engaged a consultant to study
the needs for suc a facility in April, 1977.
As described elsewhere, the City wanted co-ordinated site planning,
and F/LWC wanted a dispersed form of senior housing which would also
contain community facilities to be shared by local residents. The
Director of Social Services indicated that the proposed Metro building
and the decision for an overall participation in the large scale planning
process would be made after the consultant's study was completed.
However, the study, completed in June 1977, recommended a 250-unit
senior citizens high-rise building which would have support services, a
health monitor clinic, and a recreation center. Immediately, F/LWC
criticized the study for formulating a program "that did not reflect the
objectives of the Working Committee" for a co-ordinated development.
There had been no input from the community nor from F/LWC. [F/LWC
Critique. July 6, 1977.]
The Director of Metro Social Services pointed out that the Metro
usually developed high-rise elderly housing. In August, 1977 the City
arranged for a land swap with Metro. However, three months later in
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1977, Metro reported that it might begin the senior citizen development
in the Spring of 1979. However, on February 8, 1977, Metro decided not
build the project but rather to sell the entire 4Jiacre site to the City
for $1.4 million. Since Metro withdrew its involvement, the City was
left with two options. First, to build a senior citizens' building
through the private sponsor groups. Second, to build a 230-unit apartment
building on the site for non-profit rental housing.
The Metro Government, though wanted to build its project, was not
committed to build it in any other alternative form. Nor was Metro
committed to co-ordinated site planning with the City. Selling the land
to the City resolved conflicts between the priorities of the community
and its priorities in following the normal Metro senior citizens' housing
program.
Ontario Hydro: In July 1977, Ontario Hydro, an autonomous
Crown utility company, was considering a plan to use the right-of-way
for storage purposed when the City wanted the right-of-way for parks
and road development for the new development. Through the intervention
of a Provincial Member of Parliament, negotiations between the City and
Ontario Hydro reached an agreement by the end of November, 1977.
The City could acqure road right-of-way from Ontario Hydro on
condition that the road would be dedicated as a public street, and the
rest of Hydro land would be leased to the City as park for the development.
Provincial Government: The Provincial government owned about 3 acres
of the site for various research and laboratory facilities. In May, 1977,
the Working Committee asked the local MPP to explore the availability
and price of the provincial property. By June 1977, the Ministry of
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Labor, the agency responsible for the provincial offices on the site,
was planning to move the labs and facilities. In August in the same
year, the Province negotiated the sale of their land to the City with the
"possibility of land swap with some cash changing hands as the Province
is currently attempting to buy a piece of property in another area."
However, that did not occur. In February 1978, negotiations between
the City and the Province resulted in the selling of the land to the
City for $990,000.
9. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT & RE-ZONING APPLICATION
The community and members of F/LWC regarded the process of participation
as a long and frustrating experience. [D.Amato: Interview January, 1980]
From their perspective, not only the City had not made significant
concessions, but also that the process is "complicated by the independence
and autonomy of each agency, municipality and ministry." [F/LWC
letter to NHFL Committee dated October 24, 1977. p.3] In the proposal,
there were no constants and the rules of the game changed from day to
day.
As much as DAC-HI had divided the Cabbagetown community in the
begining , and to a great extent, united it through community involvement
towards the end, so had Frankel/Lambert united the community in the beginning
through the working committee process, but only alienated the whole
community from the new development in the end. Community involvement,
or rather the ineffectiveness of community involvement forged the diverse
interests within the community into an opposing force fighting the proposal.
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The following traces the development of community alienation
and the disintegration of F/LWC as a mechanism for participatory process.
Site Plan
The Status Report in April 1977 acted as a catalyst for the FfLWC
members to identify issues, the Preliminary Site Plan Report (July 1977)
goaded F/LWC to strategize for its support, and the Final Site Plan
(October, 1977) spurred the community to start a new process.
In essence, the Final Site Plan reiterated the issues and defended
the City's position much of which was already presented in the Commissioner
of Housing letter of September, 1977. Many of the arguments remained
the same. But by itself, the Final Site Plan implied a disregard of
the F/LWC members' viewpoints, and after the September 29, 1977 Public
Meeting, the view points of the whole community.
Public Meeting October 29,1977
'About 55-60 people attended the public meeting to hear the
Housing Department and the site plan consultant's presentation. All
the points concerning the program and the site plan from the City's
viewpoints and from the F/LWC viewpoints were discussed. But in this
public meeting, the elected representatives gave their support to the
community on more than one issue. For example, apart from their previous
support to keep Melita Street as a cul-de-sac, they now stated that
the traffic and parking problems were unresolved because the car ownership
in the area required more parking spaces. One of the aldermen suggested
the density should be reduced from 1.0 to 0.8 by reworking the proposal,
and proposed-the 38-foot height limit was to be reduced to 30-35 foot.
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Thus, the results of the public meeting were favorable to F/LWC.
F/LWC members who now only obtained unanimous community support but
also the support of their representatives on many critical issues.
What was significant about the public meeting was that when F/IWC
wrote to the City Council on November 4, 1977 recommending lower density,
higher parking requirements, more homeownership, the only F/LWC member who
used to advocate -the City Is position also signed the letter. This implied
that the split that existed before had been resolved and that within F/LWC,
there was-unanimous opposition to the project.
Other F/LWC Meetings
After the public meeting, the 5-6 meetings that followed were
poorly attended by F/LWC members. With the exception of the chairman
and one other F/IWC member both of whom attended 4 of the meetings,
the rest of the F/LWC members attended 1-2 times. As compared with the
past meetings in which 10-12 F/IWC members were usually present, now,
the meetings had 2-4 F/LWC members out of 6-11 total participants.
These meetings occurred in November .1977 to February 1978. More
important about these meetings was the act of non-involvement by the
F/LWC members, symbolizing the disintegration of the process,
but at the same time, the formation of a group of 'concerned citizens'
began to mobilize the community so as to fight the proposal.
The 'Concerned Citizens'
In February, 1978, a number of concerned citizens had been organizing
for community support to oppose the site plan and the re-zoning by-laws
by printing a series of leaflets to inform the residents about the develop-
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ment and its impacts on the community. Four leaflets were distributed
to the community each carrying a distinct message. The first leaflet
decribed the new development and the acquisition costs the City paid
to various government agencies. Both would have, it stated, " social
and financial repercussions on the surrounding community as a result
of this development." [Frankel/Lambert Development: Leaflet Issue #1]
The second leaflet compared Hector Avenue with Frankel/Lambert.
It pointed out the great disparity between them in terms of ownership,
size of backyards, and lot sizes. It warned that the development
represented 2 times the population or 2 times the number of houses per
acre. The third one questioned the adequacy of the school facilities
and stated that the result would be a return to the portable type
classrooms and a lower level of educations services. In addition,
it showed that with some 2,300 new residents, only 1 acre of park was
provided, and this would mean the existing park in the neighborhood
would become congested. The fourth leaflet described the co-operative
and the rent supplement housing in the new development, and warned that
"As taxpayers, we will be supporting these forms of housing on this site
at a cost of $1.5 million/year for the next 50 years." (F/L Leaflet #4
Issue] On all the four leaflets, the "concerned citizens" asked the
residents to attend the March 1,1978 public meeting.
Through the F/LWC chairman, the 'concerned citizens' invited the
various interest groups to attend the public meeting to discuss the
Frankel/Lambert site plan and development.
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March 1, 1978 Public Meeting
About some 150 people attended the meeting which focused on all
those issues raised by the F/LWC. What was significant about the meeting
was that the community gave its unanimous support for the position of
F/LWC. Among the important issues, some of which had been discussed before,
five were reiterated as the basis for the community objection to the site
plan re-zoning. First, the community objected to the adverse impacts of
the development on the existing community in terms of the additional
2,300 new residents, the reduced open space, and the social mix of the
existing neighborhoods. Second, they accused the various levels of govern-
ment of their lack of commitment in developing the project, especially
in view of Metro's withdrawal from building the senior citizens' home.
Third, the community questioned the cost to taxpayers for providing
assisted rental, non-profit, and co-operative housing. Fourth, they stated
the ineffectiveness of the planning process in giving control to the
community and charged that the City and the politicians had rejected
or ignored their efforts to contribute to policymaking. Fifth, they
objected to the number of changes required for the re-zoning and they
asked "will a private developer get all the proposed changes approved
if they develop the site? For example, less than 20-foot wide lots,
reduced open space, re-zoning from low to a higher density, inadequate
parking space, and so on." [Interview with residents January 15, 1980]
The results of the public meeting were two-fold: First, the commun-
ity would not support the site plan re-zoning and would file their
objection with OMB; and second, they wanted to know what concessions
the City had made, during the one and a half years of community involvement.
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On June 15, 1978 the local MPP wrote to the residents of the
community to pursuade them to withdraw their objection before the
proposal reached OMB. In his letter, he reiterated the assets of the
new development, such as 750-800 affordable homes, hundreds of new
jobs, new parks, a new school with community recreation facilities.
He concluded that the new development would enhance the property values
in the surrounding neighborhoods. [MPPs letter dated June 15, 1978)
OMB Decision
In mid-July, 1978, the community filed its objection to the
Frankel/Lambert Re-zoning by-law on the following 3 grounds: First,
the project was incompatible with the surrounding community. Second,
there would be serious negative impacts on the social, recreational,
and environmental aspects of the area. Third, the re-zoning by-law
would allow inadequate and sub-standard development.
In September, 1978 OMB approved the re-zoning application mainly
because those grounds for the objection were unsubstantiated and because
the City had made concessions as a result of community involvement
through F/LWC. These concessions, for example, included (1) the
density had been reduced to a level beyond which the project would not
be feasible, (2) homeownership component was added to the development
to reflect the neighborhood's characteristics, even though that component
was not normally developed on City's land, (4) the lot widths had been
increased to 14-16 feet, (5) the community recreational facilities would
be incorporated into the new school, and (6) a new lane would be added
to the south side of Marchmount Road to help the parking situation.
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The community did not appeal the OMB decision to the Cabinet
level, primarily because the elected representatives were not totally
against Frankel/Lambert although they agreed with the community and the
Working Committee on several issues. Without a strong and committed
political support at the provincial level, the appeal would have been
both costly and impractical. Yet, with the creation of Frankel/Lambert
Neighborhood--providing housing for the moderate and low income
households--the existing working class community became united against
and alienated from the new development.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FRANKEL/IAMBERT-ANALYSIS
The analysis is structured on the same format used in the previous
analysis in terms of the four central questions. Various aspects of
the case study will be dealt with and the thematic issues will be discussed
in the Conclusion. Moreover, using the same format based on the central
questions, the Frankel/Lambert case study will be compared with the
DACHI case study. Thus, this chapter has two purposes: to analyze
Frankel/Lambert and to compare the two cases.
The setting of Frankel/Lambert is different from that of DACHI.
Whereas DACHI was reactive to the forces of market re-investments, namely
gentrification, Frankel/Lambert was prescriptive to forstall gentrifica-
tion and to preserve the existing neighborhood's social, economic, and
physical contexts, both in their attempts to provide affordable housing.
The four central questions will be recast in light of the difference
in the setting: (1) To what extent was the City's non-profit housing
corporation able to resolve the City's housing needs and concerns in
Frankel/Lambert? And in what manner did the needs and concerns of the
City compete with those of the neighborhood? (2) Was the City's
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non-profit housing corporation, as a result of the Frankel/Lambert
developnent, conducive to the social integration of the neighborhood?
(3) To what extent did the planning process framework, namely the
working ccomittee format, allow the residents to control their environ-
ment or to achieve the goals of the community? and (4) As a mechanism
for providing affordable housing, how relevant is it to use the City's
non-profit housing corporation as an instrument to preserve existing
neighborhoods undergoing the excesses of the market place?
RESOLUTION OF HOUSING NEEDS
The City's intention was not to resolve the community concerns and housing
needs within the neighborhood of Frankel/Lambert, but rather to use the
developnent as a means to serve a city-wide housing needs. In so doing,
there was from the beginning a conflict between the City's mandate, that
is "the public interest" and the neighborhood's priorities with respect
to the development, that is "the neighborhood's interests". This conflict
will be analyzed later.
In this context, the City played the role of an advocate as DACHI
did. But in the Frankel/Lambert neighborhood the soci-economic patterns
were very different from those in Cabbagetown. The following analyzes
this aspect, as well as three other aspects of the case, and to see
in what manner they affected the City's resolution of its housing concerns.
Antecedent Conditions:
The communities around Frankel/Lambert, unlike Cabbagetown,
have a very high homeownership component--a characteristic of the ethnic
Canadians--even though these cammunities and Cabbagetown are working class
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neighborhoods. Moreover, the population, in general, has not been
affected by urban renewal or by other massive private redevelopment
that would have physically and socially disrupted these communities.
Thus, essentially, the Frankel/Lambert developnent can not be
regarded as some sort of ameliorative measures for the inhabitants
of the neighborhoods around the development. If the role of the
City's non-profit housing corporation is perceived as advocating the
cause of affordable housing, the working class families--the homeowners--
are not the ready constituents the City can work for, whereas in
Cabbagetown the residents formed a solid constituency which DACHI had
relied on.
Affordability, Equity, & Organizational Efficiency:
To fulfill the City's mandate to provide affordable housing, these
factors played an important role. The creation of the City's non-profit
housing corporation was based on the premise that -affordable housing
could be efficiently produced if the City intervened in the housing
market. Its organizational expertise relied not only on the housing
department but also on an array of other .departments such as planning,
legal, public works within the machinery of the City Hall. Compared
with DACHI, the City's non-profit housing corporation is a much
superior organization in terms of financial, technical, and institutional
resources.
Of great importance, in implementing the City's mandate are
other instruments not available for private non-profit housing organiza-
tions. These include: land-banking and the power of re-directing govern-
ment funds to serve housing for the moderate and low-income households.
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As described in the case study, the use of these mechanisms was evident
in the land acquisition and site consolidation processes. Yet, despite
its efficient structure, the City's non-profit housing was impeded by
two factors external to its operations. First, it still had to work
within the economics of development, thereby surfacing the critical
issue of density. Second, it still had to bargain with the other
levels of government agencies, as noted in the case study, which were
much less committed to the City's mandate, thereby raising the
many issues of site planning control and the concomitant community
and social facilities the neighborhood residents wanted.
Two primary factors had great impact on the issue of affordability.
In the first place, the rent structure served the moderate rather than
the low income families. Like DACHI, the rent supplement program from
the federal government was used to provide for the 25% low income families
in the development. In terms of the mandate, as espoused in the Living
Room to provide 50% of the units for families with less than $7,000 income,
Frankel/Lambert was not successful in fulfilling this goal. In the second
place, the City included the free-hold ownership component to make
the scheme to serve a wider range of incomes, or to get away from
"the project like feeling", economically speaking. of course, the commun-
ity also wanted the homeownership and even a higer percentage of that
in the developnent to reflect the existing ownership/tenure mix.
Thus, the questions of vertical and horizontal equities, apparent
in the case of DACHI, were less critical in Frankel/Lambert. In addition,
because there were no incumbent residents on the site, the problems of
priorities were less acute, in terms of horizontal equity.
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Implementation Problems:
If DACHI attempted to counteract the issues of displacement of
the working class, and of the lack of affordable housing in Cabbagetown,
the City's project in Frankel/Lambert neighborhood created new concerns
for the community. As much as the 'in-fill' component of the DACHI's
proposal became the basis for severe political opposition both at the
community and provincial levels, the scale of development and the tripar-
tite ownership of the City's project became the source of conflicts not
only between the community and the City but also between the community
and the government agencies in other levels of government.
The conflicts between the various interest groups will be discussed
later, but they precipitated a set of technical issues the resolution
of which severely tested the City's dual goals of building affordable
housing and preserving existing communities. Evidence from the case
study indicates that this set of goals is contradictory in the context
of Frankel/Lambert developnent. The main argument is that although
the City's housing policy was based on those principles, as enunciated in
the Living Room, the implementation of Frankel/Lambert developnent side-
stepped many of the principles and emphasized the role of the City as
"the developer". The Living Room envisaged the role of the City as
a "co-ordinator", asserted the "developnent of the capacity of community
based non-profit corporation as producers of housing should be encouraged",
and affirmed that "the land assembly and banking program be instituted
as the entire thrust... to redistribute the benefits of public action,
stabilize housing prices and land costs camponent for limited income
households...
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Yet, evidence from the case study indicates many of these
principles were disregarded. Not only did the City become the developer
rather the co-ordinator, it also failed to encourage local community
based non-profit organizations to become initiators rather than
spectators in the planning arena. Moreover, the targetted families
were from the moderate to middle income rather than low income brackets.
If the City had tried to follow the goals, perhaps, much of the
social alienation and the inadequacy of community participation would
have been avoided or rectified. But evidence from the case study
does not indicate that was the thrust of the City implementation
process.
The Frankel/Lambert program consisted of non-profit housing
co-operatives, among other types of housing. If not only that they became
the recipients of the City's generosity, but also that what potential
iniatitives they 'might have to bring about the involvement of the
future residents in the planning had been lost. This is in stark contrast
to the significant role that DACHI had played in bringing about a more
responsive type of community participation. The analysis of the
whole implementation process strongly indicates that the missing link lies
in the need to organize , encourage, and implement community based organi-
zations as iniatiators and producers of the housing component in the
Frankel/Lambert developnent. Other findings include the following:
o the antecedent conditions did not create a constituency
the City could work for and work with, moreover, the City's
project created a new set of social and housing concerns;
o though there were less problems concerning the equity question,
the issue of affordability was not resolved and therefore,
the original goals, as stated earlier, were not fulfilled;
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o the high homeownership rate and the City's non-ccunmitment
in encouraging community based organizations were obstacles
to the resolution of the community concerns;
o though the City's project was in itself more complicated
than DACHI, the implementation process was made more difficult
by the City's commitment to fulfil its objectives rather than
its willingness to foster a different participatory process
based on initiatives from local community organizations; and
o the need to resolve conflicts between the City and the
community was lessened because of the ubiquitous City's
mandate which cast these conflicts in terms of the public
interest(the City's) and the private interests (the neighbor-
hood's).
SOCIAL & PHYSICAL INTEGRATION OF FRANKEL/LAMBERT
The socio-economic contexts in Frankel/Lambert helped to distinguish the
dichotomy between social and physical integration. In fact, these two
aspects of integration are not synonymous. In the case of Frankel/Lambert,
they are antithetical to each other. The following analyzes this view.
The scale of the DACHI's proposal was not significant, but in the
development of that proposal, DACHI was instrumental in bringing about
a greater social cohesion within Cabbagetown, whereas the development
in Frankel/Lambert was responsible for the social alienation between
the community as a whole and the project. It was a choice the City had
to decide.,-whether the physical integration, specifically the joining
of Melita Street and other factors in the site planning, was preferrable
to the unanimous objections of the community--and the City had decided
to implement a site plan that physically integrated the new and old
neighborhoods. "Physically integrated" implied, in Frankel/Lambert
development, extending some of the streets so as to avoid the "project
feel" and the inward-oriented type of site planning.
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It must be noted that it was not a choice between two variables,
either social or physical integration, but a multitude of other vari-ables
that came into play. What these variables were will be discussed in the
following analysis. But before that one important point has to be made.
The City's intention of integrating the new and the existing communities
helped to create the Frankel/Lambert development as a part of the overall
community structure. But the irony is that placing Frankel/Lambert in the
more integrated physical environment did not help to camouflage the very
different nature of the project in terms of density, the types of tenure,
and the architectural arrangement of the project. If the development was
meant"to harmonize the new with the old neighborhoods" through physical
planning, and even at that in a very superficial manner, then disharmony
between the new and the old neighborhoods had resulted. The implication
is, of course, that despite so much physical and architectural emphasis
had been placed on the site planning, the goal of "harmonious integration"
had not been achieved. Nor could this goal be achieved without seriously
taking into account other-social and economic characteristics of neighbor-
hoods' setting.
DACHI had played the role of the advocate of the "public interest",
and so did the City in Frankel/Lambert. But that is the scope and extent
of similarities between the two organizations. If community involvement
in Cabbagetown had been the building block of community cohesion, the
working committee participatory process in Frankel/Lambert had been the
anvil on which community alienation was forged. While DACHI re-integrated
the disparate interest groups and solidified their support for the project,
the City disintegrated whatever support the interest groups indicated in
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in the beginning of community participation and solidified their object-
tions and antagonistic attitudes towards the Frankel/Lambert project.
The variables, referred to earlier, were responsible for both the
outcome of the social alienation between the Frankel/Lambert community
and the City, and the differences of the outcomes between DACHI and
Frankel/Lambert. For the purpose of this analysis, seven variables are
identified. First, the City did not have a constituency in Frankel/Lambert
to work for, while DACHI had. Second, while DACHI was community based,
the City's non-profit housing corporation was not. Third, DACHI had
established its legitimacy within the community, whereas the City in
Frankel/Lambert had not, and its legitimacy was sustained by the"public
interest". Fourth, while both were working-class neighborhoods, DACHI's
residents were renters and were the "potential victims" of displacement
as compared with the working-class families in Frankel/Lambert who were
mostly homeowners and were not the recipients of the benefits of the
development.
Fifth, while there was communication between DACHI and anti-DACHI
interest groups, the communication between the City and the neighborhood
residents was futile because (a) the City did not have the control of
the entire site due to the tripartite ownership, and (b) the City
representatives in F/LIC did not have the decision making authority.
Sixth, while the Cabbagetown residents enjoyed the political support of
their elected representatives, the Frankel/Lambert residents did not
because the aldermen had, by virtue of their office, committed themselves
to support the City 's housing policy, and because the Frankel/Lambert
development was generally perceived as "the public interest", the local
Provincial Member of Parliament supported the development. Finally,
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while the DACHI opposition could employ a wide range of strategies both
inside and outside of the process framework, the Frankel/Lambert opposi-
tion, that is, the community was very much constrained by the working
committee format. Evidence from the case study indicated that it was not
until almost in the end of the participatory process did the majority
of the committee members broke away from the working committee format
by non-participation, and it was not until the community's "concerned
citizens" had organized opposition were the concerns of the community
given the sanction and support to condemn the Frankel/Lambert development.
Underlying all these variables were not the 'technical' issues,
such as the street pattern, the density, or the parking requirements,
but rather the issue of "the public interest versus the neighborhood
interests." From this perspective, the neighborhood concerns (as a result
of the development) were subservient to the implementation process of
the public interest. The political support for the community failed
to materialize because of the public interest. The social alienation was
reified in Frankel/Lambert by the public/private interest dichotomy.
The analysis points to the following findings:
o the City's development created community concerns which were
ignored because they were in conflict with the public interest;
o the physical integration of the project by the system of
streets was superficial;
o to harmonize the new and old neighborhoods, as a planning prin-
ciple, could not be taken at the physical level alone, and it
involved not only the social and economical considerations but
also the instituting of a process framework that would allow
these considerations to be negotiated, discussed, and resolved;
o the process framework must include grass-roots organizations
and local community organizations to participate in the overall
process;
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o the unresolved conflict between the public interest and
the neighborhood interest was essentially responsible for
the social and political alienation that existed between the
community and the City, and between the community and its
elected representatives;
o identifying 'provision of affordable housing' as the public
interest was an important issue, but what was questionable
consisted of the way in which the public interest was implemen-
ted, and in which the process of participation was carried
out; and
o the social disintegration--alienating the existing community
from its elected representatives, the City, and the new
development--was the price paid for the building of Frankel/
Lambert development.
PLANNING PROCESS FRAMEWORK
This analysis focuses on the relationship between the participatory
planning process and the control the residents had over the shaping
of their environment, and on the extent to which the community achieved
its goals within the process framework.
The planning process framework used in Frankel/Lambert basically
was structured on the working committee format as a model for public
participation. The primary objective was to identify the concerns and
desires of the neighborhood residents for the purpose of helping to
develop specific plans and policies for the Frankel/Lambert development.
However, though these concerns were surfaced in the early stages of
the process (in the first 6 months of the 1 1/2 year participation),
they were not resolved. The main concerns articulated in the process--
technical issues such as street pattern, ownership/rental mix, density,
and parking requirements, programming of the development such as school
facilities, open space, and the dispersed form of elderly housing--tested
and strained the decision-making mechanisms, and re-affirmed the nature
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of the working committee. For example, the street pattern advocated by
the working committee was discarded even though it would not have econam-
ically affected the development, and even though the aldermen and the
local provincial member of parliament supported it.
What the process framework reiterated during the whole participa-
tion period was that working committee had only advisory power and
that its influence depended strictly on the support from the Planning
Board and City Council. The lack of control inherent in the process
accounted for the frustrations many of the working committee members
experienced, as the case study indicated. Unlike DACHI where the final
control and management were relinquished and placed on the shoulders of
the future residents, the City in the case of Frankel/Lambert retained
that control to the very end.
Moreover, the process framework restricted responsive dialogue
between the resident committee members and the city representatives.
Objections to any recommendations would have to be communicated to the
City Council by the members. The response to those objections so commun-
icated could be and usually was the positions as stated by the City
representatives in the working committee, for example, such a typical
response would have been the Housing Commissioner's letter.
Generally, working committees "do have the effect of making the
aldermen more responsive and accountable", [Bureau of Municipal Research.
Citizen Participation in Metro Toronto. Toronto. January, 1975. p.38]
but this can be true in the case of a private development. Evidence
from the case study indicates the opposite had occurred--that the elected
representatives were less responsive and accountable mainly because the
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Frankel/Lambert project was a public developnent serving the public
interest. In essence, the decision making mechanism was controlled by
the City, in particular, by the planning and housing departments.
The analysis of the DACHI case study pointed out the fact that,
within the planning process framework, the provincial political and
decision making machinery overrode that of the City and the communities.
The question, then, arises as to why the local MPP did not support the
objections of the community?. Basically, there were three primary
reasons. First, the local MPP was elected on the New Democratic Party
platform which advocated non-profit and co-operative housing as an alter-
native to the public housing. The Party generally was and is sympathetic
to the working class, and it favors much more government intervention in
the private market. Second, the new housing development, in place of
the existing industrial and institutional uses, was in many respects
much more congenial to the surrounding residential neighborhoods.
Finally, the absence of such issues as working class displacement, class
conflict, etc. made Frankel/Lambert development more ideologically and
politically acceptable.
All these three reasons were reinforced by the overriding City's
mandate--implying, to a large extent, that if the housing development was
initiated by the private sector, the community's objections would have been
much more sympathetically acted upon by the local MPP, and, for that matter,
by the aldermen and the City.
What follows from this argument is that the process framework insti-
tuted in Frankel/Lambert, in this manner, confined the community issues
within the format of the working committee. And, as discussed earlier,
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the working committee format was, in itself, very limited. The case
study illustrates the scope and extent of the strategies that could be
employed by the working committee members: the community concerns carefully
documented by the working committee were only responded to after a long
wait and continuous pressures from the commiteee; and the response was no
more than a re-statement of the previous positions of the City.
The views of the community residents had not been documented in the
case study, but there seems to be a stong indication that the views
as expressed by the working committee members were similar to or reflected
the views of the residents. Thus, unlike in Cabbagetown where the class
conflict between the middle and working class dominated the politics
within the process framework, in Frankel/Lambert, this class conflict
was apparently absent. Instead, the middle class--the professionals,
the business executives, etc.--which made up the composition of the working
committee in Frankel/Lambert became the leaders of the working class
neighborhood, and articulated the concerns of the community on the behalf
of the working class.
In comparison, the two case studies raise the dichotomy between
the working class homeowners as in the case of Frankel/Lambert and the
working class renters as in the case of Cabbagetown. This indicates,
perhaps, that conflicts and struggles of neighborhood residents and the
views they articulated cannot be even categorized neatly into those of 'the
middle class or 'the working class'. This issue of class conflict will
be further explored in the Conclusion.
In summary, the analysis indicates the following findings:
o the process framework not only limited the residents' control but
also frustrated the efforts of the working committee members;
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o the working committee format helped to surface community
issues early in the process, but it also ignored them without
serious consequences to the implementation of the Frankel/
Lambert development;
o the nature of the working committee as an advisory body
rather as a decision making mechanism for the residents
underlied many of the frustrations and the "feeling of
being exploited" the committee members felt about the process;
o the process framework was instrumental in insulating the
community from its elected members at the City and provincial
levels, in terms of control and political support;
o the participatory process was againg like other aspects of
the case study discussed earlier, affected by the pervasive
issue of "the public interest" to the extent that the partici-
pants' actions were identified as either supporting or not
supporting the City's mandate; and
o the analysis, further, raises the issue of class conflict,
and suggests that the views, actions, and politics within the
process framework have to be carefully looked at in relation
to the dichotomy between working class homeowners and working
class renters.
PRESERVING EXISTING NEIGHBORHOODS UNDERGOING MARKET REINVESTMENTS
The analysis focuses on the City's non-profit housing corporation
or similar public organisations as mechanisms for preserving neighborhoods
undergoing market reinvestments. Two major points have to be clarified.
First, the Frankel/Lambert community, unlike Cabbagetown, was not gentri-
fied to the extent where there was a persistent pattern of working class
displacement. Thus, in this respect, the analysis is looking at a
city's non-profit housing corporation outside the immediate scope of the
Frankel/Lambert physical parameters. Second, the meaning of 'preservation'
has been discussed in Chapter Three, and that definition applies. But,
what is more pertinent in the relationship between the city's non-profit
housing corporation and the functions of preservation is that the corpor-
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ation was created to achieve a number of policy goals which asserted
that:
the preservation and improvement of existing housing and
existing neighborhoods must be assisted by regulation, and
through financial and technical assistance... and that the
City should take an active role in housing and explicitly
the role of co-ordinator of all housing programs.
The connection between the City's non-profit housing corporation
and 'preservation', is, thus, based on the set of planning and policy
principles. The implication, posited here, is not that the City's non-
profit housing corporation alone is adequate nor the only mechanism
needed to rectify the excesses of the market place, but rather that
if the City's corporation can be made more effective and more sensitive
to the issues discovered in the previous analysis, and when it is used
in cctnbination with other mechanisms--a more favorable financial
institutional structure, using the housing program as a lever to
bring about other social and economic opportunities, and so on--then
a more powerful and constructive tool can be created to preserve exist-
ing neighborhoods.
Therefore, the analysis has to be viewed within that context.
Similarly, within the same context, the central question--how relevant
is it to use the City's non-profit housing corporation as an instrucment
to preserve neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments?--was framed.
The developnent of Frankel/Lambert was a prescriptive measure through
government intervention in the private market in order to forstall the
excesses of the market interactions. Since Frankel/Lambert development
would be entirely completed by the late 1982, the City's corporation was,
in many respects, successful.
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The underlying issue in correcting the excess of market reinvestments,
indubitably, is land ownership. To* stop working class displacement, as a.
reactive measure as in the case of DACHI, or to provide affordable hous-
ing in a community showing first signs of gentrification, but as a
prescriptive measure as in the case of Frankel/Lambert, revolves around
the question of ownership. Who owns the land and who controls the use
of land are the prime questions that have to be looked at.
Related to this aspect, the City's non-profit housing corporation
has the policy instrument of land banking--a large grant from the federal
government for the provinces and municipalities to buy land for the purpose
of providing moderate and low income housing--instituted in 1976, and
as pointed out in the Background, this changed the entire approach of
the City's non-profit housing corporation. Instead of acquiring old
existing housing stock and renovating it, as it had done in Cabbagetown
(Spruce Court) and in many projects located in the area west of Parliament
Street, the City's corporation now concentrated on constructing new
housing on land bought with the government grants.
Principally, then, Frankel/Lambert represented one of the two large
land banking projects. The other was the St. Lawrence Neighborhood.
In many respects, the land banking program became the lynch-pin on
which the thrust of Frankel/Lambert was centered. The case study of
Frankel/Lambert is, then, a study of the process of implementing the
land banking program, and as the evidence indicates, the entire acquisi-
tion of the site came through almost in the final stages of the development.
The site acquisition process became the setting in which the conflicts
between-the community's needs ard the government agencies' priorities were
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developed. Even though the land banking program was instrumental in
securing funds for the land, it took the City almost two years to gain
control of the entire site. In the interim, as the conflicts between
the community and the various government agencies increased, the govern-
ment agencies' commitment in the project decreased. Three reasons
can explain the dilemma. First, the provincial agencies, the school
boards, and others, being outside the City government, were less concerned
with the City's mandate. Second, their commitment in the housing develop-
ment was dependent on whether their own programs could be implemented
without undue interference from the community. For example, the elderly
housing involving restructuring the Metro agency's program was finally
abandoned because the compromised solution did not comply with the commun-
ity's expectations. Third, as co-owners of the site, their interest of
maintaining their control over their own program was more important than
pursuing what the City called "integrated planning".
Moreover, the land banking program, used by the City to acquire
and lease land to the private non-profit co-operative housing corporations,
was critically important as an instrument for finding available 'sites'
for these organizations. From the foregoing discussion, two important
points emerge. First, 'to preserve existing neighborhood' , the question
of land ownership was partly resolved by the policy instrument of land
banking inherent in the structure of the City's non-profit housing corpor-
ation, but the process of site acquisition, in itself, posed conflicts
between the community and the respective co-owners of the site. Second,
if the land banking instrument was critical to the private non-profit
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housing organizations, in terms of acquiring 'sites', then these organiza-
tions had been delegated the role of 'recipient' of the governmen largess,
rather than the role of an active'initiator' similar to that of DACHI.
Therefore, the private non-profit organizations were perceived by the
community as no more than part of the City 's machinery.
The role the City's non-profit housing corporation played in the
transformation of the physical environment is an essential component
in the dicussion of the relevance of the corporation as a mechanism to
preserve neighborhood. Tied to the issue of land ownership, is the
question of the scarcity of available land. In this respect, the City's
corporation land acquisition usually concentrated on industrial and
institutional types of land use, within the City's urban boundaries.
As described in the case study, Frankel/Lambert development was built on
such lands. If the overall process framework has pointed to the creation
of the split between the community and the City, the physical transforma-
tion of the site will indicate a much more compatible environment. If
the street pattern has become the fulcrum on which the balance of the
public and private interest is hinged, the physical design and the general
physical planning concept behind Frankel/Lambert will indicate a definite
envrionmental improvement in the community.
Indeed, the architectural detailing, the choice of materials, and
the facades prove to be a superior development--superior to most of the
private market developments, if my past eight years' experience in the
housing design field does not fail me. Thus, on the one hand, the outcome
of the planning process proves to be a very sensitive physical development,
while on the other hand, the process framework, the conflicts, and the
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community alienation have been the basis on which the high-quality and
congenial physical environment has evolved. This is, indeed, the irony
of Frankel/Lambert. Variables contributing to the 'irony' have either
to be changed or to be sensitively catered for.
In way of addressing these variables, the advantages and disadvantages
of the City's non-profit housing corporation wi-li be discussed as to its
relevance as a mechanism for preserving neighborhoods undergoing excesses
of ma-rket reinvestments. The discussion will use the analysis in Chapter
Three as a basis to compare the City's corporation with the private non-
profit housing organizations.
Advantages:
Four advantages are identified. First, the City's corporation
has an efficient organizational structure. The experience learned by
the staff is retained within the organization, as compared with the
'one-shot' experience of all private non-profit co-operative organizations.
This difference is further reinforced by government stipulations forbidding
'mother co-operatives'. Second, the expertise required for implementing
housing developments and for assuming the concomitant roles in management,
co-ordination, and supervision, within the City's structure, is superior
not not only to the private non-profit housing co-operatives but also to
a majority of the private sector developnent companies. The expertise
is further improved by 'in-house' departments, and by full-time involve-
ment in the projects by qualified staff. This is in stark contrast to
private co-operative organizations which usually rely on part-time amateur-
ish staff and usually lack the benefits of any in-house expertise.
Third, the City's corporation has a valuable policy instrument--
the land banking program--which is not available to private housing co-
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operatives though these organizations share the benefits of the program
as evidenced in the case of Frankel/Lambert. Fourth, because of the
City's mandate to provide affordable housing, political opposition at
both provincial and community levels is curtailed, thereby avoiding
delays similar to those encountered by DACHI. Thus, these four reasons
point to the technical effectiveness of the City's housing corporation.
Disadvantages:
Six disadvantages are identified. First, because of the notion
of "the public interest" serving the people who are inadequately housed,
the City's corporation may not serve those within a particular community,
as the case study illustrates. Thus, the City has a cause but it has
no constituency to work with, as compared with a community based private
housing co-operative like DACHI both of these components were present.
Where working class communities with high homeownership as in the case
of Frankel/Lambert or in lower-middle class communities with also high
homeownership, the issue of "the public interest" will be made more
acute. In that respect, the credibility of the City to 'preserving
existing neighborhoods' will be continuously under attack.
Second, related to the first point and illustrated by the Frankel/
Lambert case, social cohesiveness of the community will work against
the City's corporation when the community's socio-economic contexts
are ignored. From this, it seems that the City's corporation can best
serve "the public interest" in communities where the homeownership is
generally low and where the displacement of working class families is
imminent or has taken place as in Cabbagetown (the City's project Spruce
Court). Though the point is made within the context of this discussion,
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it should not be construed as either a recommendation or a suggestion
of the study. As will be pointed out in the Conclusion a different
process framework has to be first set in place before some of the issues
raised in the analysis can be resolved. But what this points to is
that the demographic and social structure of the communities are an
important factor as to the receptivity of the City's projects.
Third, the implementation of "the public interest" greatly limits
the process framework, as instituted in Frankel/Lambert, and dissipates
the commitment of the participants in the process, thereby abrogating the
the basic principles of political equality and democratic structure inherent
in grass-roots participatory processes. There must be a recognition that
"centralized" or "elitist" control is both antithetical and detrimental to
community based control.
Fourth, related to the above point, the format of the working
committee is no more than an ostentatious form of co-optation. It
gives legitimacy to the City by 'working with the community', it ignores
comnunity's concerns, it alienates the neighborhood representatives from
the decision making process, and it amalgates control and superficial
citizen participation all at the expense of social disintegration and
disillusionment. If the street pattern had been symbolic of not accepting
the City's developnent, so had been the emergence of "the concerned. citi-
zens" symbolic of the disillusionment of the whole process framework and
of the inefficiency of the working committee format.
Fifth, the potentialities of private non-profit co-operatives as
agents of community involvement, as illustrated by the DACHI case study,
have been nullified as in the case of Frankel/Lambert. Moreover, in con-
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nection with the City's non-profit rental housing, the dichotomy between
control and use, as discussed in Chapter Three, remains unresolved.
Talking about tenant-management arrangement in public agency owned
housing, as in the case of Frankel/Lambert's non-profit housing component,
John Hands asserted:
It[tenant-management] is contradictory because ownership and
control are indivisible. If houses are owned by a local
authority or housing association, such an outside body must
take ultimate responsibility, and therefore exercise control
in discharging that responsibility. It is unwise because
such a token arrangement almost invariably leads to worse
discontent by raising expectations about decision-making which
are subsequently shown to be false...Tenant management associa-
tion--such an arrangement normally proves satisfactory only as
an agreed step in a transition towards a [non-profit]
co-operative. [Hands, John. Housing Co-operatives. London:
Society for Co-operative Dwellings Litd. 1975. p.30]
The point is made because the underlying issue is control and,
therefore, the ownership of the land as one of the most important
factors in preserving neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments.
The contention of the discussion is that control and ownership must
reach the residents of the housing, as in the case of a co-operative
like DACHI. Public ownership of the land contributes to anti-inflationary
market operations and is essential in preserving neighborhoods, but within
the micro-environment of the housing development, collective ownership
as in co-operatives, is essential to integrate the two components of
control and use. Thus, the City's non-profit housing corporation fails
in two respects. First, it undermines the potentialitis of private
non-profit co-operatives as a driving force for community involvement.
Second, the non-profit housing component still leaves the control/use
dichotomy unresolved.
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Sixth, the issue of affordability has been discussed earlier, and
it has been shown that the City's non-profit housing corporation has
failed to reach the target groups, as specified in the Living Room.
The discussion, here, is to point out that not only is that issue
left unresolved, but also that the attitude of the City towards the
question of affordability is almost unconstructive and negative.
The evidence as presented in the case study is inadequate to
illuminate this point, but an article in a local newspaper can clarify
the problem. The article highlighted the resignation of an alderman
from the City 's non-profit housing corporation because the alderman wanted
an income ceiling on the City's housing. In part, it reads:
[The alderman] told the board there must be a ceiling on the
income of tenants 'if the program is to remain credible in
the eyes of taxpayers...But [the mayor] said the non-profit
program was never designed to attract only low- or middle-
income families, even though the vast majority of tenants
are in these categories...[The alderman] suggested that
accommodation be refused to families earning more than
$24,000 a year, which is about 10 per cent higher than
the median on current applicants for the corporation's
apartments.. .tUnder (the alderman's] proposal, tenants'
incomes would be checked every three or four years and those
whose incomes exceed the limit would have to pay a surcharge
on their rent...But [the mayor] said the proposal would curtail
the practice of providing a good mix of tenants who earn
different incomes. [Toronto Star. January 24,1980]
The contention of the discussion is not that "a good mix of
tenants who earn different incomes" is undesirable because it, to a certain
extent, neutralizes the stigma of "public housing", but rather that
a more stringent percentage of the mix must be specified and also that
the internal surchage (as outlined in the Background), instituted by
the National Housing Act since 1975, must be implemented so that the
higher-income tenants would be surcharged above economic rents, and these
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'profits' would, then, be used to reduce costs payable by other tenants.
Thus, in order to achieve goals leading to a more horizontal and vertical
equity in the City's non-profit housing, the internal surcharge must
be enforced and the income mix of the tenants must be specified. At least,
in part, the resolution of the issue of affordability can be tackled within
those policy contexts.
The analysis points to the following findings:
o the City's non-profit housing corporation has a great organiza-
tional capability and expertise as a mechanism for preserving
existing neighborhoods at the start of market reinvestments
(Frankel/Lambert) or undergoing market reinvestments
and in this respect, is very much superior to the private non-
profit organizations such as DACHI;
o the technical superiority is very much reinforced by the
policy instrument of land assembly program, but, however,
(outside the time frame of Frankel/Lambert) this program
since February 1980 has been discontinued;
o the discontinuation of the program diminishes much of the
potency of the City's corporation as a mechanism for preserv-
ing neighborhoods, and moreover, as the analysis indicates,
the disadvantages now definitely outweigh the advantages;
o though the technical expertise has already set in place
at the City Hall, much of the City's housing activities
will require a drastic change from that of a developer/
co-ordinator to that of a manager, following the demise
of the land assembly program; and
o many of the issues raised in the analysis such as 'afford-
ability', 'social disintegration','process structure', and so
on, could only be resolved by a re-structuring of the overall
policy framework.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION - A SYNTHESIS
AND FINDINGS
The primary purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the various parts
of the study. The synthesis is carried out in terms of the findings of
the analysis and in terms of the issues surfaced in the course of dis-
cussion. In conclusion, the chapter recapitulates the major findings
of the study focusing on community based co-operative housing.
SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
The previous chapter has compared the two case studies. The emphasis of
the following is to synthesize the findings. The framework for the
synthesis follows the sequence of the four central questions.
1. The extent to which the two non-profit housing organizations could
resolve the social concerns and housing needs of the neighborhoods.
The socio-economic contexts of the two neighborhoods were very different.
In Cabbagetown, DACHI found a constituency to work for and to work with.
In Frankel/Lambert, the constituency was absent. Whereas the socio-
political reactivism came from the Cabbagetown middle class renovators,
thereby constituting major obstacles for DACHI to implement its goals, the
same reactivism came from the working class homeowners in Frankel/Lambert.
Because of the structure of DACHI, its legitimacy was established
within Cabbagetown as a community based organization and as an advocate
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of the working class. In the case of the City's corporation, its
legitimacy was imposed on the community which did not share the goals
the City was pursuing. The City's role in advocating the city-wide
housing policy was only superficially accepted by the community, even
at that, the acceptance was the result of the City's mandate.
If DACHI resolved some of the community concerns, the City's
corporation created new concerns. Though both organizations were not
successful in providing affordable housing to meet their target groups,
the City's corporation ignored the question of affordability by not imple-
menting 'internal surcharge'--a policy instrument designed for making
the higher income residents pay above the economic rents so as to ensure
public housing more vertically equitable.
DACHI was able to a great extent resolve the conflict between
housing as a shelter and use component and housing as a shelter and
investment component. Also through 'collective ownership', the residents
in DACHI co-operative housing were both the landlord and renters. Though,
City's housing in Frankel/Lambert was anti-inflationary, like DACHI,
the division between control and use was not bridged. City ownership
implying ultimate control and tenant management implying secondary control
were and are contradictory.
Working class neighborhoods with different rental/ownership mix
implied different kinds of needs and community concerns, the nature of
which had significant implications on the implementation process, the
question of legitimacy, and the role of advocacy. In a gentrified neigh-
borhood, political obstacles were set up by the middle class renovators,
and in a neighborhood like Frankel/Lambert, the same obstacles were set up
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by the working class homeowners.
Though the City's corporation was much more efficient than DACHI,
the conflicts between the community and the City were unresolved, whereas
those between Cabbagetown and DACHI were resolved by a much more responsive
participatory process. Thus, in many respects, because of DACHI's commit-
ment in tackling some of the community concerns, it was able to implment
its goals. In contrast to DACHI, the City's corporation created new
community issues which were left unsolved. Moreover, its commitment
was found in the implementation of the public interest which, in itself,
was contrary to the needs of Frankel/Lambert. Though the Frankel/Lambert
development was successfully implemented, the community concerns would
remain ignored.
2. Which one of the two non-profit housing organizations was conducive
to the social and physical integration of the communities?
If the role of advocacy deepened the division between the interest groups
in Cabbagetown, then it alienated the whole community in Frankel/Lambert
from the City and its elected representatives. The underlying reason
was that DACHI being a community based organization was responsible for
a participatory framework in which all interest groups could interact.
The class and political divisions between the interest groups were, to a
great extent, resolved within the process framework. A range of participa-
tory techniques were used to mobilize the 'moderates'. Whereas, in
Frankel/Lambert, the working committee format was the only vehicle for
consensus building.
Cabbagetown became more socially integrated when the moderates
began to participate in the planning and the development of DACHI. But
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the Frankel/Lambert community became more and more alienated from the
City, as the constraints of the working committee format became less
and less tolerable. If the street pattern was symbolic of the physical
integration , then, the 'concerned citizens ' organization was symbolic of
the social alienation.
Thus, in terms of the social and physical integration of the com-
munities, the two organizations offered a study of contrasts: DACHI
aggravated the class and political divisions and then re-intergrated
the community, whereas the City's corporation mitigated the pluralism of
interests among Frankel/Lambert residents and then alienated the community
from the process and its elected representatives; while DACHI advocated
the needs of Cabbagetown, the City's corporation accused the community
of anti-public interest.
3. To what extent the process framework, as instituted in the two commun-
ities instrumental for achieving residents' control and the goals of
the neighborhoods?
Both the public meeting process and the working committee process
were not effective in building community consensus and in enhancing res ,-
dents' control over decision making. But in the case of DACHI, the frame-.
work was extended to a range of workshops, block meetings, various sub-
committees, and so on. In this manner, the majority of the residents,
(such as the Cowley-house residents, the moderates) participated in the
development of DACHI. More significant, was the transfer of control from
the board of directors to the community.
In Frankel/Lambert, even though the format was ineffectual in
allowing the neighborhood residents to share in decision making, even though
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it surfaced community concerns, and even though its created the conflict
between 'the public interest' and 'the community interest', the format
remained intact and the control never left the hands of the City. Thus,
community concerns were ignored and the participants were alienated from
and antagonized by the process framework.
The "bottom up" structure of DACHI versus the "top down" structure
of the City's corporation was one significant factor in the process frame-
work. The other was concerned with the definition of goals: DACHI's
goals were synonymous with the community's; and those of the City's were
antithetical to the Frankel/Lambert residents'. These two circumstances
helped DACHI to relinquish its control to the comnunity, but also helped
the City to retain its control. From this perspective, the process frame-
work in Cabbagetown contributed much to the residents' control over decision
making and to the achievement of the community's goals. In contrast,
the process framework in Frankel/Lambert did not.
4. Which of the organizations can be significant in preserving neighbor-
hoods undergoing excess market reinvestments?
It must be reiterated that the contextual framework in which this
question was posed must be taken into account. Chapter Five describes
that context, and without reference to it, the question can only be tauto-
logical.
Neighborhood based organizations, like DACHI, have many advantages
over pyramidal structured organizations like the City's non-profit housing
corporation. Most of the advantages lie not in the efficiency and the .
expertise of community based organizations but more in the overall process
framework for identifying the needs of the community, working with the
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community's residents, and meeting the goals and needs of the community.
In a gentrified neighborhood, there are usually the affected interest groups
which will be critical to the participatory process and the role of advocacy
these community based organizations usually assume. Thus, as in Cabbagetown,
there is a unified set of goals both community based organizations and
the community can work towards. Even in a less gentrified neighborhood,
like Frankel/Lambert where the homeownership rate was high, community
based groups can work for those working class renters.
Moreover, non-profit housing co-operatives are conceptually more
superior to public owned non-profit rental housing because the first kind
integrates control and use, and resolves the division between owners and
tenants, whereas. the second kind of housing still retains that division.
The resolution of this aspect of ownership is critical to the idea of pre-
serving neighborhoods. Though, it is outside the scope of the thesis to
undertake empirical studies to either confirm or reject the many advanatges
embedded in co-operative housing--such as better care for the housing,
more sharing of responsbilities, and more constructive behavioral patterns--
several such studies had been conducted confirming these aspects in
co-operative residents, Of these studies, Jonathan Zimmer 's and Donald
Sullivan's are seminal investigations of these aspects of co-operative hous-
ing. [see J.Zimmer. From Rental to Cooperative: Improving low and moderate
income housing. California: Sage Publications Inc., 1977, and also
D. Sullivan. Cooperative Housing & Community Development. New York: Praeger
Publishers. 1969]
The technical capability and the expertise in the City's corporation
cannot be overstressed. Moreover, the land assembly policy that underpinned
(the policy now is discontinued) the City's superiority was not available to
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the private community based organizations. But, if these instruments
have been useful to the implementation process, as evidenced in Frankel/
Lambert, they are equally effective in not meeting the needs of the commun-
ity and in not instituting a more responsive participatory process.
Given superior technical efficiency and expertise within the City's
corporation, a balance should, at least, have been struck between the
public goals and the community goals, between technical proficiency in
the implementation process and respecting community concerns, between
physical integration and the socio-economic integration, and between an
elitist type of planning and a community based planning. Evidence from
the findings strongly indicate the balance is very much biased against the
community. In the words of a city planner very much involved with the
Frankel/Lambert project:1'advocacy planning is not necessary when the City
is building moderate and low income housing." Perhaps, such an attitude
is indicative of the modus operanti of generally elitist planning, but
it was definitely representative of the faulty foundations on which
community involvement was built.
Thus, on the one hand, the City's corporation type of organizations
have the great potentials for preserving neighborhoods by assembling land
for the moderate and low income housing, implementing the housing develop-
ments, and managing the built environment. But on the other hand, the
City plays these different roles, often, at the expense of alienating commun-
ities. The community based organizations are less efficient but they
are the conerstone on which community involvement and cohesiveness are built.
The choice would have been difficult to make if it were not for the fact
that the land assembly program was terminated. For all these reasons,
community organizations, like DACHI, are more valuable mechanisms to pre-
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serve neighborhoods undergoing market reinvestments.
THEMATIC ISSUES
Several themes pervade both the case studies and the analysis. The thematic
issues, as a way of structuring the study, are critical to the exploration
of the politics of both the processes and the types of non-profit housing
organizations in question. Four thematic issues are~identified for the
synthesis of the study.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST versus NEIGHBORHOOD INTERESTS
Gans identified two types of public interest: majoritarian and
communal. The division of the public interest into these two types
underlies the essential differences between DACHI and Frankel/Lambert.
In the case of DACHI, the goal was in the majoritarian public interest
because "it is shared by the majority of the population"; whereas in the
case of Frankel/Lambert, the goal was in the communal public interest
because "it is essential to the existence of a 'moral community' even
if the majority of the population does not share it." [ Herbert Gans.
"The Public Interest and Community Participation: Toward a Reconstruction
of Public Philosophy." AIP Journal. January 1973. p. 10]
Identifying DACHI's goal with the majoritarian, or Frankel/Lambert
with the communal, can only be valid at the community level. The main
reason is that, because of the different time frame, though DACHI's goal
was accepted by the majority of the Cabbagetown residents, the goal was
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not part of the City's housing policy which at that point in time was in
the offing. But in the case of Frankel/Lambert, the goals were very much
part of the City's housing policy even though the majority of the Frankel/
Lambert residents refused to accept it.
This differentiation of the two types of the public interest
underlies the major difference between the two case studies. The process
framework in Frankel/Lambert suffered the same problems inherent in the
implementation of the communal public interest. First, the problem
of identifying communal goals because they generally turn out to be shared
by only a part of the population. As in Frankel/Lambert., the housing
development did not benefit the incumbent homeowners, though the school
facilities partially satisfied some of the needs of the residents. Second,
without the consensus or the majority agreement, these goals have to be
legitimated by a "suprapolitical norm that is of greater priority than
the wishes of the community." (Gans. ibid. ] In Frankel/Lambert , that
suprapolitical norm was the City's mandate, and the clash between the
priority accorded to the norm and the concerns of the community resulted
in the social alienation and the antagonism of the residents, as the
analysis has indicated. Third, to impose the norm on the community
requires two conditions: legitimation of the process and the kind of power
and control by which that norm is imposed on the community. In Frankel/
Lambert, legitimation and control were coalesced in the process framework
based on the working committee format.
Thus, in the case of Frankel/Lambert, the inherent problems of
implementing communal goals: pluralism, imposition of a suprapolitical norm,
and the control required for such imposition were crudely resolved by the
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City relying on the constrained process of working committee.
If DACHI's goals were in the majoritarian public interest and if
implementation of the goals did not encounter the same set of problems
described earlier, the conflicts between the public interest .and the
private interests were aggravated by the contradictions ( rather the
conflict of interest) among the major actors, at the city and provincial
levels. At the city level, crucial to the conflict between the public
interest and neighborhood interests, was the instrusion of political
interests of the elected representatives. Dilemma resulted when the
political interests represented were inconsistent with the public interest
the City advocated. The resolution of these dilemmas affected the outcome
of the majoritarian goals DACHI represented.
At the city level, the mayor was elected on the Progressive Conser-
vative party platform--the political party that dominated the provincial
parliament. Despite his endorsement for the City housing policy advocat-
ing non-profit housing groups, and despite his commitment in preserving
the existing neighborhoods, the mayor swayed in his commitment in support-
ing DACHI, because the local PC member of parliament had approached him
for support. Buffeted between his own ideological viewpoints and the
public'interest( the City's housing policy)he advocated on the one hand
and his political allegiance to his political party on the other, he
resolved the dilemma by resorting to technical and bureaucratic measure.
As noted in the case study, the measure was the "due process of planning"
which would have delayed DACHI to the extent that to build the co-operative
would have been impossible.
The implication is that not everyone who was against DACHI was
confronted with the conflict between the public interest and the private
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(political) interests. Indeed, some aldermen known for their ultra-
conservative stand and who might be sympathetic to the PC party could
be consistent with their political ideology.
At the provincial level, even though the local MPP was the provin-
cial secretary of housing, even though she was a member of the task force
study encouraging non-profit housing organizations, and even though she
advocated the public interest (to build affordable housing through non-
profit groups) in her speeches, she was the major political opponent of
DACHI. The rationale for her fight against DACHI was her political inter-
ests and her control of these interests in her riding to which Cabbagetown
belonged. Moreover, the conflict between the public interest and private
interests was reinforced by the DACHI opposition leaders at the community
level who had been strong party campaign organizers. Though her actions
were very consistent with her political interests, they were also contra-
dictory to the public interest she advocated. Again, the resolution of
the dilemma was based on 'technical' grounds such as density, open space,
and so on, and her political interests were realized by defeating DACHI
on the issue of building the new townhouses.
In summary, the dichotomy of the public interest versus private
interests pervaded different levels of the planning process: the community
(described in the case studies), the city, and the provincial levels.
The discussion posits four major points. First, a distinction must be
drawn between majoritarian and communal public interest, and the conflict
between the public interest and private interests can only be succinctly
discussed at the community level. The Frankel/Lambert case exhibits the
characteristic problems of a communal public interest at the community level,
yet the public interest was very much a majoritarian interest (the housing
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policy) at the city level. Similarly, DACHI's goal was not a majoritarian
public interest at the city level (since it was prior to the formulation
of the city housing policy), but at the same time the problems usually
associated with communal public interest was absent in Cabbagetown. Second,
the discussion rejects theories that claim that the public interest, as a
whole, can be somehow be defined by 'neutral' and 'disinterested' legisla-
tors and public officials. The very nature of the NHA Amendments (1973)
was a result of intensive social and political pressures brought to bear
on changing the traditional ways of housing people. Therefore, the discus-
sion confirms the theory that it is only through the continuous conflict of
the full diversity of affected interests that a reasonable approximation
of responsive public interest can be developed.
Third, the discussion posits the view that whenever the private
interests of the powerful or of the major actors clash with the public
interest, the conflict is (or is hoped to be) resolved through the guise of
'neutral' and 'disinterested' objections. Fourth, the discussion posits
the view that communal and majoritarian public interest (when identified
at the community level) are not abstractions because they affect and shape
the process structure, the control mechanisms, and decision making differ-
ently, as illustrated by the two case studies.
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MIDDLE CLASS & WORKING CIASS
Class conflict characterized the struggles of the existing working
class for the preservation of their social and economic survival in Cabbage-
town against the incoming middle class renovators. The market reinvestments
would help to redefine anew the social and economic boundaries within which
different social and economic groups would be slotted in the way commensurate
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with the existing social and economic stratified structure of our neighbor-
hoods. The irony, then, seems to be that if Cabbagetown had been catalytic
for the formation of DACHI, it had been so at the expense of drawing sharper
divisions among its residents because DACHI, in turn, eventually became
the pivotal point around which the polarization of different classes revolved.
If Cabbagetown portrayed a class conflict between the working class
and the middle class, then Frankel/Lambert drew a sharper picture of the
conflict between the working class homeowners and the low-income residents
of the new development. The conflict is reinforced by the existing residents
when they stereotyped the city development as 'public housing'. The irony
is, of course, that the low-income residents of the new project will only
make up to twenty-five per cent of the total households, and the rest of
the new residents come from similar, if not higher income brackets.
The theme of class conflict, with respect to Cabbagetown and
Frankel/Lambert, touches on three aspects of the issue. First, the class
conflict in both case studies remained unresolved. Even if DACHI was
able to build the "in-fill", then it was only a question of whose interests
had been promoted. Similarly, if Frankel/Lambert could not be implemented,
only the twenty-five percent rent supplement and the working class
'non-homeowners' would not be accommodated.
Second, the analysis and the case studies seem to affirm that
politics and ideology tend to take precedence over technical aspects of
planning--politics and ideology that revolve around the class conflict.
Much of the opposition in both Cabbagetown and Frankel/Lambert had been
based on the ideological and class interests of the property owners.
Third, both the renovators and property owners were "likely to collaborate
when each person can see a danger to him or his family in some proposed
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change; collective action is a way, not of defining and implementing some
broad program or the benefit of all...(they) likely to see matters in terms
of specific threats and short term costs." [James Wilson. "planning and
Politics" in H.Spigel's Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal. Vol 1.
Washington. pp. 50-51]
The quote, of course, was intended by Wilson to refer to the "private
regarding" political ethos of the low and lower income class people. But
it applies equally well to the middle class people in Cabbagetown. What
this implies is that the case study evidence seems to reverse Wilson's
theory. Though both case studies significantly pointed out the class con-
flicts that underlied the viewpoints, biases, and motivations of the property
owners, it would be simplistic to categorize private or public regarding
in terms of class stereotypes for the following four reasons.
First, it was the middle class professionals who advocated the
interests of the working class in Cabbagetown. Second, the case study of
Frankel/Lambert indicates that the working class homeowners behaved the
same as the middle class renovators in Cabbagetown--keeping the lower income
households out. Third, the silent middle class 'moderates' in Cabbagetown,
mobilized by community involvement, finally gave their support for
DACHI, indicating a shift of their viewpoints concerning housing the incum-
bent renters. Fourth, the renovators in Cabbagetown and the working class
homeowners in Frankel/Lambert who lived close to the projects were the most
committed opponents because their property value would be most threatened.
So far the discussion suggests that, perhaps, much of the political
ethos and actions was first motivated by ideology (world view), then, by
interests (property or political), and finally by the control of those inter-
ests in view of specific threats as a result of a new development.
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The triptych of ideology, interest, and control becomes the under-
pinning structure of the politics and the processes involved in the two
case studies. For example, the conflict between the middle and working
class in Cabbagetown was very mcuh triggered by the ideological differences
between them. These differences will include the middle class 'right'
to social mobility to live in a 'fashionable address' versus the lower or
working class right to stay in a working class neighborhood. The groups,
then, as a result of different ideological constructs, have different sets
of interests. Among these interests would be the inflated property value
or the lack of affordable housing stock. The control would be to protect
the inflated property value or investments on the one hand and to retain
the diminishing affordable housing stock on the other.
This interrelationship of the triptych's three components, the
springboard for political actions, cannot be categorically stereotyped into
class lines. It is the ideology that defines what those interests are
in the first place. To illustrate this point, the advocates--the DACHI
founders--were middle class professionals who were essentially motivated
by their ideological belief. Their property value (some of them were home-
owners) and the control of their property values did not play a role in
the confrontation. Indeed, the working class homeowners in Frankel/Lambert
expressed their views and ideology in a manner not dissmiliar to those
of the middle class renovators. This implies that class conflict will
continue and its resolution lies not in one particular class but in those
who share the ideology of bringing about a more equal society. Writing
on ethnic neighborhood preservation, Antonio DiMambro asserts that:
I sincerely doubt that such radical cultural transformation
will occur and that the full implications of cultural
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pluralism will be realized, particularly since the inten-
tions and concerns of ethnics do not reveal a desire to
transform the infrastructure...As we shall see, ethnics appear
content with the capitalist economic framework and reveal
a desire to 'make it" and be part of the society.
(Antonio DiMambro. "Preservation & Development of Ethnic
Neighborhoods. MIT unpublished Master's Thesis. 1977. p. 176]
Perhaps, this description succinctly explains why the ethnic neigh-
borhood in Frankel/Lambert shared much of the aspirations and expectations
of the middle class. Homeownership is a very indicative step towards
the desire to 'make it", and this aspect of the socio-economic contexts
of the neighborhood made Frankel/Lambert so different from Cabbagetown
in terms of the ideological construct.
MARKET REINVESTMENTS versus NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION
This thematic issue underlies the genesis of both private non-profit
and public non-profit housing organizations. The connection between these
organizations and the thematic issue, in particular, to help to stabilize
existing working class neighborhoods is made not by personal imputation
but rather by both the city housing policy (1974) and the federal task force
on housing (1969). Both DACHI and the City's corporation, within this
context, are anti-market activities either to check (or attempt to stop)
the prevailing excess of market reinvestments, as in Cabbagetown, or to
forestall similar occurrence, as in Frankel/Lambert. Thus, DACHI was re-
active: and Frankel/Lambert was prescriptive, both within the realm of
intervention in the market place.
Market reinvestment per se can have both positive and negative
consequences on neighborhood social and demographic structure. Obviously,
what concerns this discussion is the excess of such reinvestment, and in
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particular, the phenomenon of a gentrified neighborhood market place--
the displacement of the working class. Market reinvestment ties with
many principles: the freedom of mobility and the freedom of choice.
The issue is not so much arguing against these democratic principles,
as focusing them within a larger context. The issue, then, becomes the
conflict of two sets of democratic principles: between one's democratic
and economic right to move to where one chooses and one's democratic and
social right to remain in one's neighborhood. A sharper focus of this con-
flict will be embedded in the question of whether or not the economic
superiority of the more mobile group can supercede or abrogate the social
right of the less mobile group to stay in working class neighborhoods.
Paradoxically, the second group was put in working class neighborhoods
in the first place because of the stratified economic order underpinning
the market place. and, indeed, the infrastructure of our society.
As much as we can reconcile working class displacement with the
'rational' understanding of the excesses of the market forces, so can we
reconcile economic and social stratification with the discernment of the
rationale and order behind it. Class and economic divisions are structured
by their own rationale and order. The rationale is one entrenched in the
dominant view that housing is a credit good to be speculated on and that
its dual relationship rests on the idea of housing as both a shelter and
an investment. The order is the dynamics or the politics of setting these
views in place, and once in place, the resultant economic and social strati-
fication. Inclusive in the workings of the dynamics is the racial and ethnic
stratification because of the way different racial and ethnic groups are
set up in the socio-economic strata of our society.
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The stratified boundaries of neigborhoods, of course, are not
static. They can be shifted and manipulated by marketing techniques.
The current real estate market in Toronto, wanting to capitalize the
"fashionable Cabbagetown address", has betowed the title of "Cabbagetown II"
on the working class neighborhood east of the Don River. Such lineage,
a creation of the economic order, is re-defining the stratification bound-
aries. The story of DACHI will indubitably be repeated there.
Indeed, the power of the market system fosters efficient production
and minimizes the need for coercion (either through democratic majoritarian
consensus or through authoritarian dictate) as a means of organizing society.
Simultaneously, market like arrangements reduce as well as substitute the
need for "compassion, brotherly love, and cultural solidarity as motivating
forces behind social improvement." [Charles Schultze. The Public Use of
Private Interest. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1977. p.18]
But, if the market "unanimous consent" behavior is superior to
political majoritarian consensus, it is so only when everything is equal,
so that people are on equal footing to transact voluntarily. Evidently,
in an unequal society--wage disparity, barriers to social and racial
mobility--the concept of voluntary decisions and uanimous consent is
vitiated. In this respect, uanimous consent is no less coercive than
political majoritarian rule.
The analysis and the discussion of the case studies indicate that
the remedial measures lie not within the market framework but rather
outside of it, especially in the third sector non-profit and co-operative
housing organizations that would bridge the fundamental chasm between
control, shelter/use on the one hand and ownership and shelter/investment
169
on the other. Yet, the irony is clear--with a phenomenon such as
"Cabbagetown II", organizations such as DACHI seem ineffectual not unlike
David fighting Goliath without the sling.
SHELTER/USE versus SHELTER/INVESTMENT
Whether a heterogeneous, balanced, or unstratified neighborhood
is ever possible within our homogeneous, unbalanced, and stratified
society is not the question. As pointed out in the earlier discussion,
the moral question is the extent to which we allow our society's inequities
to reinforce the economic Power of one group by denigrating the democratic
right of the other group to stay in its neighborhood--an issue pertaining
to the fundamental freedom of choice of the first group and to the restric-
tions on that freedom of choice of the second group. This, in turn, raises
the political and the socio-economic stratification relationship. Where
the two hierarchies do not reinforce each other or at least partially inde-
pendent, the possibility exists that the political can modify the socio-
economic. This can happen where the political stratification system is
more egalitarian than the socio-economic one. Under such conditions,
those on the socioeconomic heirarchies "will have better political positions
...(and) they can use such positions to influence governmental policies
to change the socio-economic stratification patterns". [Sidney Verba, N.
Nie, and Jae-on Kim. Participation and Political Equality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1978. p.3]
Underlying this relationship and pertaining specifically to our con-
ventional attitudes towards land use and housing is the dichotomy of land
ownership and land use. The distinctions between the two establish the
170
the separation between the two concepts in a framework that provides the
opportunity to regulate land use while resolving the problems emanating
from private ownership and land speculation. Back-to-the-city movements
and other revitalization programs can produce collective needs that can
only be provided for through societal efforts. The political reality
of the separation of land use and ownership especially among Western nations
has "distinctly impeded efforts to regulate land and provide for societal
needs." [Urban Land Policies and Land Use Control Measures. Volume VII.
Global Review. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations,
New York, 1975. pp.120-121]
The separation of ownership and use in this respect can only respond
to new concepts of social equality in which the right of land use should
be available to all individuals. The rights of ownership may be of less
concern if the rights of land use are held to be separate and distinct.
Because the two are intrinsically interwoven, the speculative elements
surround much of urban land development. The federal task force on
housing asserts:
The right to own and dispose of property and to take a reasonable
gain from one's labours are an integral part of the Canadian trad-
ition. But the Task Force seriously questions whether such rights
can be stretched to encompass situations where the owners of land
reap gigantic financial benefit not from improving or working it,
but merely by allowing it to lie fallow or in admitted under-use
while the efforts of the community around it make such land an
ever increasingly valuable asset." [ Report of the Federal
Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. Canada. January
1969. p. 38]
Policy instruments are not lacking dealing with these issues. Much
depends on whether or not the political stratification is more egalitarian
than the socio-economic one. Among these instruments are land taxes and
user charges which can capture for social use some of the gains, or
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'Betterment" values, accruing to land and housing owners in urban areas,
as Grimes indicates:
More adequate taxation, if it were combined with special taxes or
higher rates for unimproved land, could reduce incentives to hold
land for speculative purposes...In practice, an inability to keep
assessments up to date and the granting of exemptions--often poli-
tically motivated--can severely constrain the effectiveness of land
use measures. [Orville Grimes, Jr. Housing for Low-Income Urban
Families. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976.
pp. 97-98]
Neighborhoods are microcosms of the larger substantive infrastruc-
ture of our society. The issues surfaced in the discussion represent some
of the many obstacles facing the provision of affordable housing for the
low and moderate income families in the urban areas. Resolution of these
issues requires basic changes in our society, in particular, in our own
perceptions and attitudes towards housing and land. Of this stratified
and disjointed system, co-operative non-profit housing seems to be the
antithesis. As pointed out in the analysis, it basically integrates those
who control and those who use and combines property rights with the con-
cept of non-profit; ownership with tenancy; and management responsibilities
with consumers control.
The individual homeowner has a dual relationship to his house.
It is both shelter and investment.. But in a non-profit co-operative, the
ownership is collective and is for shelter only--a use. Though the
dichotomy of shelter/use and shelter/investment pinpoints the different
market forces operating in the neighborhoods, the implication is that not
all homeowners in the private market contributed to the rampant speculation.
But, nevertheless, the shelter/investment conception has propensities for
speculation, and what happened in Cabbagetown was the realization of. these
propensities.
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GENERAL FINDINGS
This section recapitulates the important findings of the study and points
out the major policy and program changes required for the expansion of
the third sector housing. Emphasis is placed on non-profit co-operative
housing organizations.
FINDING #1: Existing federal programs and funding priorities
generally restrict the delivery capability of co-op
organizations.
At the federal level, the non-profit co-operative program has not
been sufficiently funded. In 1978 non-profit rental housing had some $120
million, while co-operative had about $37 million. Federal program stipu-
lations encourage the ad hoc arrangements of co-op groups and discourage
a more integrated system of "mother co-operatives".
Federal stringent housing standards have contributed to high material
and construction costs. Through resource re-distribution, the non-profit
co-operative program can be expanded.
The land-banking program has been a very important instrument in
providing the limited housing sites in inner-city neighborhoods for working
class families. If it is going to be re-instituted in the future, the
municipalities must allow third sector groups greater control over the deve-
lopment of housing on landbanked sites.
FINDING #2: Within the process framework, class conflict in terms
of views, actions, and politics have to be carefully
looked at in relation to difference between working
class homeowners and working class renters.
The usual categorization of class conflict between working class
and middle class, and of political ethos (public or private regarding) per-
taining to these groups is not useful for understanding the conflict.
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FINDING #3 : The socio-economic contexts of neighborhoods have
significant impact on the success or failure of
non-profit co-operative housing projects.
The neighborhood contexts include its history, population change,
homeownership/rental mix, income groups, and so on. Two models of neigh-
borhood scenerio are used to illustrate this guideline.
Neighborhood Scenerio - Model #1: This model is most favorable to
private non-profit housing groups for the implementation of co-operative
housing. The following are the characteristics of this model: (a) working
class neighborhood with low homeownership/high rental ratio; (b) low income
levels; (c) stable community without blue collar class displacement;
(d) residents have been 'radicalized' or articulate of their needs; (e) land
and existing housing stock are inexpensive; and (f) interest groups are not
dominated by middle class residents' neighborhood association.
The characteristics of Model #1 imply (a) co-operative housing
can be made more 'affordable'; (b) there is more horizontal equity in the
implementation of the project; (c) a solid constituency, co-operative hou-
sing advocates can for with and work for; (d) conflict between community
groups and co-operative advocates is not likely; (e) a base for community
support is established; and (f) views and attitudes of the working class
renters are sympathetic to co-operative housing especially when the incum-
bent residents are the potential users of the project.
Neighborhood Scenerio - Model #2: This model is the least favorable
to the third sector co-operative housing. It is characterized by the
following: (a) a working class neighborhood with high homeownership/low
rental ratio; (b) influx of high income white collar class residents; (c) inten-
sive displacement of low income renters; (d) unstable community with high
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rate of population shifts; (e) inflated land and property value; and
(f) incumbent residents not 'radicalized' or inarticulate of their needs
and the neighborhood associations dominated by the middle class renovators.
These characteristics imply the following: (a) co-operative housing
cannot be made 'affordable' unless with deep government subsidy; (b) verti-
cal inequity will result; (c) a lack of constituents to work for; (d) conflict
between community interests (articulated by the middle class residents)
and low income renters' interests is apparent; (e) a base for community
support is absent; and (f) views and attitudes of homeowners are hostile
to the creation of co-operative housing.
These two models represent the extreme ends of the spectrum of inner
city working class neighborhoods. Between them there is a wide variety of
neighborhood settings, each of which is made distinct by the range of
variations of each of the neighborhood characteristics. Though the two
models have been categorized into the "most favorable" and the "least favor-
able" for implementing non-profit co-operative housing, it must not be
construed that private non-profit groups must concentrate on neighborhoods
characterized by Model #1--DACHI setting up co-operatives in Cabbagetown
(not unlike Model #2) is as valid as an advocate group working in Model#l
type of neighborhoods. But rather the implication is that Model #1
neighborhood setting offers the line of least resistance for the third
sector groups. The decision rule--for choosing which neighborhoods to
work in--must balance the ease of implementation with the constituents one
identifies with.
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FINDING #4 Both the project scale and the type of construction
significantly influence community support for or
opposition to non-profit housing projects.
Neighborhood residents, if they are generally against non-profit
co-operative housing, have no bases for their objections when the project
planned is a small scale (one or two houses) renovation development.
In-fill housing, requiring community support and re-zoning application, is
difficult to implement in Model #2 neighborhood setting. New construction
involving large scale development is the most difficult to implement and
is usually outside the technical capability of the third sector groups.
As the project scale increases and as the type of construction
changes from 'renovation' to 'new construction', the physical and social
impacts on existing neighborhood become more and more critical, the conflict
between meeting community needs and implementing the development intensifies,
and community opposition sharly increases. As the project shifts from
neighborhood setting Model #1 to Model #2, community opposition to the
project grows exponentially.
The implication is that the third sector housing groups should develop
their technical skills not so much for building large scale projects as
improving their delivery capability by building more 'scattered site'
small scale projects (renovation, in-fill, or new construction). The rela-
tionship between the neighborhood setting and the project scale and type
is significantly critical to co-operative housing, for example, a medium
scale in-fill and new construction housing project can be much easier to
implement in Model #1 neighborhood setting than a small scale in-fill
honsing in Model #2 neighborhood setting.
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FINDING #5 : Non-profit co-operative housing groups must be
commmunity based in order to serve the local
housing needs.
Community based organizations, working with and for neighborhood
residents, can reduce conflict among the interest groups. Because of
the nature of the organizational structure, community based co-ops
can work better within the neighborhood structure and institute a
planning process that responds to local interests. For "outside" groups,
conflict between their interests and community interests will most
probably adversely affect local control and decision making. Furthermore,
through a community based organization, local residents can develop
community leadership and take part in the overall community decision
making.
FINDING #6 : The organizational structure of non-profit co-ops,
critical to the delivery capability, is presently
very weak. It must be strengthened.
At present , existing government policies only encourage individual
co-ops. These groups are "one-shot" ad hoc organizations and whatever
expertise and skills gained by the co-op members are "lost" because
the government program does not allow them to continue developing
other projects. The following are several suggestions that would help
to improve the organizational structures
(a) Private non-profit co-ops must press for program changes so
that a new organizational network can be created;
(b) this "network" comprises the creation of mother co-operatives,
area-wide organizations that help to initiate co-operative
ventures, to give guidance to 'new' individual co-operatives,
to promote co-operative housing through educating and informing
the public and through lobbying at various levels of government
for program and resource distribution changes;
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(c) the funding of mother co-operatives should include not only
the provision of technical expertise (for the'daughter' co-ops)
but also for those activities required to "find" new community
groups interested in co-op housing and to co-ordinate all
these activities within the overall co-op structure network;
(d) mother co-ops should be encouraged by federal regulations, pro-
grams, and grants;
(e) this organizational structure is critical to the promotion
and expansion of non-profit co-op housing, and once in place,
'daughter' co-ops can rely on a continuing technical base for
advice;
(f) this structure is different from community resource groups be-
mother co-ops have the responsibility to 'initiate' and 'pro-
mote' non-profit co-op housing whereas consultant groups may
only provide technical services; and
(g) though the mother co-ops give guidance and advice to individual
co-ops, the control over management and decision making still
belong to the individual co-ops
This structural framework can provide for a greater delivery capa-
bility and promotion of non-profit co-operative housing. But it has to
function within a participatory process so that local interests and needs
are not ignored. This process is discussed below.
FINDING #7 : The developnent and implementation of non-profit
co-ops must be done with a community based part-
icipatory process that allows the users' and other
interest groups' input and involvement.
Instead of the working committe format (which should be abandoned
as a participatory mechanism), an effective method of organizing com-
munity particpation is a workshop format. Workshops should be structured
around community issues and concerns in order that inputs from all inter-
est groups can be generated to implement plans and strategies addressing
these issues.
Workshops specifically oriented for the co-op users should develop
guidelines for collective arrangements in management, maintenance, resi-
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dents selection and so on. In conjunction with the structural framework
inputs from the mother co-ops would be invaluable.
Neighborhood associations' representatives should generate guide-
lines for open spaces, location of the housing units, community services,
and other needs that would impact the development. The workshops format
can go into the design stage of the development involving the co-op users.
In principle, the participatory process must include the interest
groups and the 'affected' constituents in the community through the exist-
ing community organizational network. Mechanisms for participation other
than workshops are available and maybe more applicable to small scale rehab-
ilitation type projects. But whatever mechanism is adopted, it must func-
tion within a process framework that allows 'affected' interest groups
to be heard and provides a format for consensus building.
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